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I. INTRODUCTION
Some years back they were given the name of muckrakers,1 as
a term of derision. Far from being shamed or deterred, however,
they began to wear their title as a badge of honor and to engage
more actively and vigorously in exposing corruption, oppression,
abuse of authority, and other kinds of wrongdoing. Given by now
the more professionally sounding appellation of investigative re-
porters, they reached an apex of fame and admiration at the time
of Watergate. Today they serve a valuable purpose in our society.
Their exposes often lead to cleanups and provide a deterrence
against wrongdoing, especially at the governmental level, that no
other agency of our society can furnish so effectively.2 The law has
taken into account this valuable service and affords reporters privi-
leges and leeways somewhat broader than the prerogatives that
other citizens possess. Contrary to the viewpoint of some members
of the news media, however, these privileges are not, and should
not be, absolute.
Investigative reporters operate in areas in which there are
sharply conflicting personal and social interests. In seeking to pro-
mote the social interest in the public's right to know, an investiga-
tive reporter may injure or impair an important personal interest
of an individual. Suppose, for example, that the Watergate crew
had been composed of reporters and their agents seeking informa-
tion to publish. Would their conduct have been justifiable and,
therefore, immune from legal sanction? Again, suppose that a
newspaper, supporting one candidate for sheriff, on the day before
election knowingly published a false charge that the other candi-
date had been convicted of incest in his youth. These are extreme
examples, I know. Their purpose, however, is to indicate that a
line-dividing process is necessary and that the line is drawn on the
basis of balancing of conflicting interests.
1. Historians have credited President Theodore Roosevelt with using the term. Presi-
dent Roosevelt took it from John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, in which Bunyan described
the man with the muckrake as one "who could look no way but downward, with a muckrake
in his hands; who was offered a celestial crown for his muckrake, but who would neither look
up nor regard the crown he was offered, but continued to rake to himself the filth of the
floor."
2. For a popular portrayal of the accomplishments of current leading examples, see L.
DOWNIE, THE NEW MUCKRAKERS (1976).
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In the whole of the common law, the law of torts most con-
cerns the balancing of interests. Sometimes this balancing is done
in laying down a rule of law. Sometimes the balancing process is
more individualized, and the rule of law incorporates a standard
that requires discretionary application depending upon the indi-
vidual facts in the case. In the United States, however, first
amendment constitutional concerns for freedom of speech and
freedom of the press affect the common law balancing process in
many tort cases concerning investigative reporters. The field of
constitutional law is another one in which the courts have much
experience in the balancing of interests.
What occurs here, therefore, is a combination balancing pro-
cess, involving the principles of both tort law and constitutional
law.' If the two come into direct conflict, the principle of constitu-
tional law, of course, prevails. But there is an interplay here that
affords due weight to common law principles.
While the law addressing reporters' rights draws upon two
fields, the law also addresses two different activities of investiga-
tive reporters. These activities are obtaining the "information," or
newsgathering, and publishing that information. Newsgathering
and publication usually trigger different torts, but some torts may
stem from either activity. While publication is the primary concern
of the first amendment, the United States Supreme Court has indi-
cated that the first amendment also protects "newsgathering.
' '4
II. DEFAMATION
A. The Cause of Action
The tort of defamation 5 concerns the publication aspect of the
investigative reporter's activities.6 The interest that the tort seeks
to protect is the reputation of the plaintiff. Damages, therefore,
3. For an elaboration on this combination balancing process, see Wade, The Commun-
icative Torts and the First Amendment, 48 Miss. L.J. 671 (1977); see also Ingber, Defama-
tion: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L. REv. 785 (1979).
4. "The use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden or restricted; report-
ers remain free to seek news from any source by means within the law. . . .Finally, as we
have earlier indicated, newsgathering is not without its First Amendment protections ......
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 707 (1972); see also Note, The Right of the Press to
Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 838 (1971); Note, The Rights of the Public and the
Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. Rav. 1505 (1974).
5. Defamation encompasses libel and slander. Libel, which is the written form, is the
form that is of primary concern in this Article.
6. The investigative reporter generally works for a newspaper, which, as the principal,
normally is also liable for the agent's tort.
1984]
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include compensation for "actual harm" to the reputation, and
emotional disturbance arising from that harm. Under the common
law, strict liability was imposed upon the defendant if the pub-
lished statement was defamatory and false and the defendant in-
tended to publish it. Whether the defendant was at fault or inno-
cent with respect to the falsity of the publication made no
difference. The rationale was that the injury to the plaintiff's repu-
tation was just as great regardless of whether the defendant was to
blame for the falsity of the communication.
In the 1964 landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,8 the Supreme Court held for the first time that the first
amendment applied to an action for defamation and might restrict
some of the traditional common law features. Specifically, the
Court held that a government official, as plaintiff, could not re-
cover without showing, "with convincing clarity," "that the state-
ment was made with 'actual malice'- that is with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not."'10 The New York Times decision and its progeny have re-
shaped completely the law of defamation."
In St. Amant v. Thompson,2 the Court sought to clarify the
meaning of its expression, "actual malice." It explained that "reck-
less disregard for truth or falsity" of a publication requires proof
justifying the conclusion that "the defendant in fact entertained
7. These early strict liability cases, both in England and the United States, usually
concerned newspapers or book publishers. See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3
F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920);
E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, 1910 A.C. 20 (H.L.); Morrison v. John Ritchie & Co., 1902 Sess.
Cas. (Fr.) 645 (Scot. 2nd Div.).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. Id. at 285-86.
10. Id. at 279-80.
11. The circumstances under which New York Times arose appear to have forced the
hand of the Court. In the midst of the turmoil surrounding school desegregation efforts, the
New York Times carried an "editorial advertisement" seeking contributions of funds. The
advertisement referred, among other matters, to an episode at Alabama State College, in
Montgomery, and contained some minor factual errors. Plaintiff, police commissioner for
the city of Montgomery, sued the Times for libel and obtained judgment for $500,000. Id. at
256. The editorial advertisement made no reference to the plaintiff by name or position.
Other government officials in the state brought similar suits, apparently to prevent the New
York Times and other newspapers from carrying critical comment about the state's racial
situation. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court's judgment, held that the refer-
ence to the plaintiff-police commissioner was not adequate to meet the constitutional test of
convincing clarity. Id. at 287-88. For more on the factual background, see Pierce, The Anat-
omy of an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1965).
12. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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serious doubts as to the truth of the publication."' 3 The Court also
used other expressions carrying a similar meaning, such as whether
defendant exhibited a "high degree of awareness of ... probable
falsity,' 1 4 or "whether the publication was indeed made in good
faith."'1 That the test laid down is subjective rather than objective
is obvious.
The nature of the reckless-disregard test has created a distinct
irony for the investigative reporter. As the title indicates, the in-
vestigative reporter's professional obligation is to investigate-to
check on the reliability of sources and the accuracy of information
obtained. This test, however, creates an incentive not to investi-
gate if any question at all exists about the accuracy of the "infor-
mation," since the investigation might turn the question into "seri-
ous doubts" and make the publication a violation of the New York
Times standard. The Court expressly recognized this risk,, but
made no effort to avoid it.1
The subjective nature of the test for reckless disregard, unfor-
tunately for journalists, gave rise to encroachments upon the jour-
nalists' state of mind. In Herbert v. Lando,i s an Army officer, suing
for defamation in a production of Sixty Minutes and having to
prove "serious doubts," sought to depose the defendant-reporter
on his state of mind and obtain discovery of relevant editorial com-
munications. The Second Circuit held that the defendant was enti-
tled to an absolute privilege under the first amendment, 9 but the
Supreme Court reversed. The Court held unanimously that de-
fendant must answer under oath questions on state of mind and by
a majority that the lower court should have permitted discovery of
the editorial communications. The Court could have avoided, or at
least alleviated, these encroachments if it had made the test of
reckless disregard objective rather than subjective. The opinion in
St. Amant itself suggests one way to make the test objective when
13. Id. at 731.
14. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)).
15. Id. at 732.
16. "It may be said that such a test puts a premium on ignorance, encourages the
irresponsible publisher not to inquire, and permits the issue to be determined by the de-
fendant's testimony that he published the statement in good faith and unaware of its proba-
ble falsity." Id. at 731.
17. Id. at 731-32. The recent motion picture Absence of Malice vividly illustrated that
the risk is not an idle one. In that movie, a newspaper attorney advised the newspaper not
to investigate in order to avoid potential liability.
18. 441 U.S 153 (1979).
19. 568 F.2d 974, 975 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
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it states that professions of good faith will not "be likely to prevail
when the publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that
only a reckless man would have put them in circulation." 20 Why
not use that as the standard itself?
After New York Times and St. Amant, the Court quickly
moved to enhance the barriers to libel actions. In Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts, 21 a badly divided Court extended the constitu-
tional restriction on the availability of a libel action brought by a
government official under New York Times to plaintiffs who might
be characterized as "public figures." Four years later, a plurality of
the Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.22 extended the
knowledge-or-reckless-disregard test beyond particular plaintiffs to
the subject matter of the publication. Rosenbloom held that the
knowledge-or-reckless-disregard requirement applied if the pub-
lished material was a "matter of general or public interest." Three
years later, however, the Court rejected the Rosenbloom standard
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,23 its second landmark libel case.
The Gertz Court stated that the determination should not be left
to "state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which
publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which
do not."' 24 As Justice Powell commented, "We doubt the wisdom of
committing this task to the conscience of judges."25 Translation: it
is not feasible to draw up a definition of public or general interest
that will guide the several courts to reach decisions on an organ-
ized, consistent basis, and the Supreme Court will not fall into the
trap of undertaking it on a case-by-case basis. Rosenbloom, there-
fore, no longer has significance.
In addition to abandoning Rosenbloom's high fault standard
based on the subject matter of the publication, the Court in Gertz
laid down two significant constitutional rules applicable to a libel
action brought by a private, rather than a public, plaintiff. First,
the Court held that "so long as they do not impose liability with-
out fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
20. 390 U.S. at 732.
21. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The opinions were widely scattered, with no single opinion
having the full concurrence of five justices. Indeed, the opinion of Chief Justice Warren,
which prevailed on the results reached in the two cases, did not have the full concurrence of
any other member of the bench.
22. 403 U.S. 29, 45 (1971) (Court found the arrest of a person for allegedly selling
obscene literature to be an "issue of public or general interest").
23. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
24. Id. at 346.
25. Id.
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standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual. 26 This pronouncement
abolished the common law rule of strict liability for defamation. As
a result, most states have adopted a negligence standard, while
some states have adopted a higher test including the knowledge-or-
reckless-disregard standard. Second, Gertz held that the states
"may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages ...
when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth. - . . It is necessary to restrict...
plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disre-
gard. . . to compensation for actual injury."2
Finally, the Court in Gertz narrowed the definition of the term
public figure and, thus, limited the impact of Butts. Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have continued this trend.28 Now that it
is necessary for even a private plaintiff to show fault on the part of
the defendant the suggestion may be offered that the Court has
had second thoughts and no longer has the zeal it showed in Butts
and Rosenbloom to expand the coverage of the reckless-disregard
standard.2 9
B. Defenses
Certain defenses available to the tort action for defamation
have important implications for the media.30 The first of these is
the privilege of fair report or the reporter's privilege, which con-
cerns the reporting of official governmental proceedings or ac-
26. Id. at 347.
27. Id. at 349.
28. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
29. The Court's zeal arguably was not so great at the time it decided these cases. The
Court was woefully divided, see supra notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text; two members
had taken the position that all defamation actions were unconstitutional, and the Court had
not yet decided Gertz, which held that all plaintiffs must show fault. The Court since has
repudiated Rosenbloom, and could have classified the plaintiffs in Butts and Walker as gov-
ernment officials.
30. Several absolute and general privileges exist that this Article does not address be-
cause they have no particular application to actions against the news media. These privi-
leges include (1) absolute privileges for judicial officials and persons participating in a trial,
legislators, and certain administrative officials; and (2) conditional privileges for persons
seeking in good faith to protect their own interests or those of others. These general privi-
leges, when combined with the elements of a cause of action for defamation, illustrate very
aptly the balancing of interests that takes place in the substance and application of the law
of defamation. See REsTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §§ 585-592A (absolute privileges), §§
593-605A (conditional privileges) (1976).
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tions31 In this context, the primary issue shifts from the question
of whether the defendant was at fault in ascertaining whether the
defamatory charge was false to the question of whether the report
was accurate and fair. 2 Even though the reporter has serious
doubts about the truth of the charge or does not believe it himself,
no liability exists if the report is accurate and fair. A verbatim re-
port would, of course, be accurate; but it is often found necessary
to summarize. The summary may raise the issue of whether the
reporter has interpreted accurately the original report or state-
ment. The summary must also be fair; the reporter cannot take a
charge out of context if it would give an erroneous impression, or
state the charge accurately, but fail to report the rebuttal to it.
s3
Some recent decisions have broadened the scope of the reporter's
privilege, extending coverage beyond reports of official proceedings
and actions to reports of public meetings, provided the meetings
are open to the general public and deal with a matter of public
concern.
3 4
How has the first amendment affected this common law privi-
lege? In Time, Inc. v. Pape,35 the defendant summarized parts of a
report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights regarding
police brutality. Defendant Time, referring to one incident of al-
leged brutality, stated the allegations as facts rather than as al-
leged facts. The Court declared that the "omission of the word 'al-
leged' amounted to the adoption of one of a number of possible
rational interpretations of a document that bristled with ambigui-
ties" and decided that the "deliberate choice of such an interpreta-
tion, though arguably reflecting a misconception, was not enough
31. See id. § 611; see also RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS App. § 611 (1976 & Supp.
1983) (citations to cases); L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 79-80 (1978); Barnett,
The Privilege of Defamation by Private Report of Public Official Proceedings, 31 OR. L.
REv. 185 (1952); Bryson, Publication of Record Libel, 5 VA. L. REV. 513 (1918); Sowle, Defa-
mation and the First Amendment: The Case for a Constitutional Privilege of Fair Report,
54 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 469 (1979).
32. See, e.g., Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975).
33. Many cases hold that no privilege exists to report the contents of a complaint filed
in a lawsuit before an answer is filed or the court has ruled on it. The purpose is to prevent
the abuse of the privilege through collusive action between the person filing the suit and the
reporter. See Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 61 N.E.2d 5 (1945);
Nadelmann, The Newspaper Privilege and Extortion by Abuse of Legal Process, 54 COLUM.
L. REv. 359 (1954). But see Campbell v. New York Evening Post, 245 N.Y. 320, 157 N.E. 153
(1927).
34. See, e.g., Pulvermann v. A.S. Abell Co., 228 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1956); Borg v. Boas,
231 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1956); Phoenix Newspapers v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P.2d 150
(1957). It is generally agreed that the meeting must regard a matter of general concern.
35. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
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to create a jury issue of 'malice' under New York Times."36
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,3 7 following a sensational divorce
trial between two socialites, the Supreme Court found that the
trial court granted a divorce to the husband in a decree that in-
vited misunderstanding. 8 Time reported the divorce as a para-
graph in its "Milestones" section, stating that it was granted "on
grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery."3 9 Contending that the
court did not find her guilty of adultery, the wife sued for libel.
The Supreme Court, finding the wife to be a private figure, held
that the state court judgment would be "entirely consistent with
Gertz," if Time was found to be at fault in publishing the ac-
count 4° and remanded the case for a determination of whether
Time was negligent.
On the issue of fair and accurate report, the apparent explana-
tion of the two cases is that the Court in Pape construed the reck-
less-disregard standard of New York Times to mean that the de-
fendant's interpretation of the official proceeding is not subject to
liability if it is a rational one. In Firestone, the Court construed
the fault requirement of Gertz to mean that the defendant is liable
for a negligent interpretation. These cases, it would seem, amount
to a recognition of constitutional protection of the privilege of fair
report.
Suppose an investigative reporter interviews several persons
and receives some answers that defame the plaintiff. In publishing
a news report, can he avoid all liability by quoting the persons he
interviewed and stating that he takes no responsibility for the
truth or falsity of their statements? At common law, the answer to
this clearly has been "no"; one who repeats a defamatory state-
ment is liable even though he says he does not believe it.4 ' The
36. Id. at 290.
37. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
38. Id. at 458-59.
39. Id. at 452.
40. Id. at 463.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1976); see also Dixon v. Newsweek, Inc.,
562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS App. § 578 (1976 & Supp.
1983) (citations to relevant cases); Painter, Republication Problems in the Law of Defama-
tion, 47 VA. L. REv. 1131 (1961). As one court noted, "tale-bearers are as bad as tale-mak-
ers." Harris v. Minvielle, 48 La. Ann. 908, 915, 19 So. 925, 928 (1896) (quoting M. NEWELL,
THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, LIBEL AND SLANDER IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 350 (1st ed.
1890). Common law prohibits one from repeating defamatory rumors even as rumors. In a
situation giving rise to a conditional privilege, the privilege may extend to publishing a de-




Supreme Court implicitly recognized this common law rule in St.
Amant v. Thompson.42 Defendant, delivering a televised political
speech, read some questions that he had put to an individual and
then the latter's answers. The Court noted that one of the state
court's reasons for judgment against St. Amant, was that "he mis-
takenly believed he had no responsibility for the broadcast because
he was merely quoting [the individual's] words. '43
The Second Circuit, however, in Edwards v. National Audu-
bon Society,44 espoused what it called the privilege of neutral re-
portage, which would constitute a change in the common law rule
of liability for repeating a defamatory statement if the Supreme
Court should decide to adopt the concept. In Edwards, a publica-
tion of the Audubon Society had charged that scientists who were
claiming that increases in the size of annual Christmas bird counts
demonstrated that DDT was not injurious to bird life, were either
lying for pay or ignorant on the subject. A newspaper reporter in-
duced the author of the Audubon publication to name the scien-
tists whom he had in mind, and then published the story in the
New York Times, together with denials of those named scientists
that the reporter was able to contact.
The court of appeals reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff-
scientists in a libel action against the Times and dismissed the
complaint. Without making any reference to the common law priv-
ilege of fair report or rule of liability for repetition of a defamatory
statement, the court laid down a "fundamental principle" that
[W]hen a responsible, prominent organization like the National Audubon So-
ciety makes serious charges against a public figure, the First Amendment pro-
tects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless of
the reporter's private views regarding their validity .... What is newsworthy
about such accusations is that they were made .... The public interest in
being fully informed about controversies that often rage around sensitive is-
sues demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges
without assuming responsibility for them.45
While the concept of neutral reporting has received the ap-
proval of a number of law review commentators," the courts have
42. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
43. Id. at 730. This, of course, was not a formal ruling.
44. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
45. Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
46. See Sowle, supra note 31; Note, Protecting the Public Debate: A Proposed Consti-
tutional Privilege of Accurate Republication, 58 Tax. L. REV. 623 (1980); Note, Edwards v.
National Audubon Society, Inc.: The Right to Print Known Falsehoods, 1979 U. ILL. L.F.
934; Note, The Developing Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 VA. L. REv. 853 (1983); Note,
Libel and the Reporting of Rumor, 92 YA. L.J. 85 (1982); Comment, Constitutional Privi-
[Vol. 37:301
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received it less enthusiastically.47 Although the Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari in the Edwards case,48 it seems unlikely that the
Court will be ready to adopt the Edwards principle of neutral re-
porting. Observe the equivocal expressions of Edwards: (1) "seri-
ous charges," (2) made by a "responsible, prominent organization,"
(3) "against a public figure," and (4) given "accurate and disinter-
ested reporting." A single ambiguous term of similar nature caused
the Court in Gertz to repudiate Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.49
As Justice Powell said in Gertz, "We doubt the wisdom of commit-
ting this task to the conscience of judges." 50 Perhaps the Court
could reduce this list of ambiguities by recognizing the neutral re-
portage privilege only in cases concerning the reporting of a preex-
isting public debate, with the reporter playing no part in provoking
the defamatory statement or taking sides as to its resolution. Even
this limitation, however, probably would be insufficient for the
purpose of reducing ambiguity. In short, Pape and Firestone are
likely to be treated as establishing the equivalent of a constitu-
tional privilege of fair report, but the privilege of neutral reportage
is not likely to muster constitutional protection. It remains to be
lege to Republish Defamation, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1266 (1977). But see Comment, Edwards
v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: A Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation
Should be Rejected, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1203 (1982); Comment. "The Privilege of Neutral
Reportage"--Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 347.
47. For cases rejecting the privilege of neutral reportage, see Dickey v. CBS, 583 F.2d
1221 (3d Cir. 1978); Tunney v. American Broadcasting Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 769, 441 N.E.2d
86 (1982); Newell v. Field Enters., 91 IM. App. 3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434 (1980); McCall v.
Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
975 (1982); Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 608, 325 N.W.2d 511 (1982);
Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 446 N.Y.S.2d 836, af'd, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 444 N.E.2d
1002, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982).
For cases recognizing the privilege, see Kraus v. Champaign News Gazette, 59 IMI. App.
3d 745, 375 N.E.2d 1362 (1978); Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 426 N.Y.S.2d
274 (1980); cf. Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 899 (1980).
On whether the privilege of neutral reportage should apply specifically to the activities
of investigative reporters, compare Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (apparently yes), with McManus v. Doubleday & Co., 513 F. Supp. 1383
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (apparently no). The Second Circuit itself indicates that the Edwards prin-
ciple does not apply to a publisher who "espouses or concurs in" a report of charges made
by the newspaper. See Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 68 (2d Cir.
1980). In Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 145 n.38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836
(1981), the court declared that its rejection of the neutral reportage privileges in Dickey v.
CBS, 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978), was only dictum.
48. It also denied certiorari in McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co.,
456 U.S. 975, and in Medico v. Time Inc., 454 U.S. at 836. See supra note 47.
49. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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seen whether the Court will extend the privilege of fair report
under Pape and Firestone beyond official proceedings to public
meetings of general concern and to official actions.
C. Some Legal Issues
1. Expression of Opinion
At common law, a "privilege" of fair comment existed under
which persons might comment on something like a book, a play, a
record, or a performance offered to the public for its inspection
and approval. So long as the comment was a fair expression of
honest opinion and not a statement of fact, no liability ensued
even if the opinion was derogatory. This common law privilege now
appears to have been absorbed in a broader rule, derived from
statements and holdings in three Supreme Court cases, leading to
the position that there can be no recovery for a mere expression of
opinion.51 Although none of the cases rules authoritatively on the
matter, the Second Restatement of Torts also has adopted this po-
sition as a rule, but has added that a statement, although in the
form of an opinion, will be actionable if the statement implies the
existence of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opin-
ion.52 To come within the protection of the Restatement's expres-
sion-of-opinion privilege, an investigative reporter must state
clearly the established nondefamatory or true facts on which he
51. Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 339 (footnote omitted). Two other cases indicating
adoption of the expression-of-opinion privilege are Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), and Greenbelt Coop. Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). None of these cases contains an express holding to this
effect.
For other perspectives on the privilege, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 566
(1976); see also Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75
MICH. L. REv. 1621 (1977); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1227-45 (1976); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54
Tsx. L. REv. 1221 (1976).
52. A substantial number of cases have adopted and applied the Restatement position.
See, e.g., Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d at 54; Good Gov't Group of
Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 672, 586 P.2d 572, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 552
P.2d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976); Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977); National
Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 396 N.E.2d 996
(1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42
N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
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bases his opinion, which he must present only as a personal
opinion.
Three other reasons often used in interplay with the opinion
rule may support a finding that a statement is not actionable be-
cause it does not state defamatory facts. First, the statement may
use amorphous or ambiguous language, so that it does not make a
specific charge.53 Second, the statement may amount to no more
than name-calling or abusive language that clearly is not intended
to be taken literally.54 Third, the statement may have been made
in ridicule or jest, again clearly not intended to make a literal de-
famatory charge.5 5 In all three instances, the statement cannot be
interpreted reasonably as a clear statement of defamatory facts.
2. Burden of Proof
Who has the burden of proof for truth or falsity in defamation
cases? At common law, the law presumed a defamatory statement
was false and required the defendant to raise truth as an affirma-
tive defense. The constitutional requirement that a public person
must show knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity and a pri-
vate person must show negligence as to falsity may have the effect,
not only as a practical matter, but also as a constitutional require-
ment, of putting the burden of showing falsity on the plaintiff.
56
3. Retraction
What is the effect of a retraction or refusal to retract on a
defendant's liability? Before the New York Times decision, when
courts imposed strict liability, many states had retraction statutes
that played an important part in defamation suits. A defendant
who had defamed the plaintiff innocently might avoid liability by
retracting. Now that the Court requires fault, however, a retraction
is not as significant, except as a practical matter in working out an
amicable, out-of-court arrangement. A retraction also may be im-
53. See Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977); see also Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d at 54; National Ass'n of
Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. at 220, 396 N.E.2d at 996.
54. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264 (1974); Moriarty v. Lippe, 162 Conn. 371, 294 A.2d 326 (1972).
55. See Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co., 210 Ala. 369, 98 So. 290 (1923); Blake v.
Hearst Publications Inc., 75 Cal. App. 2d 6, 170 P.2d 100 (1946).
56. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff carried the burden of proof for showing
truth or falsity in Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 454 U.S. 962 (1981), but the case was settled. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 581A, 613 caveat (1976).
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portant under other circumstances. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,57 for
example, the defendant, after learning that the divorce decree le-
gally could not have declared the plaintiff guilty of adultery if the
trial judge awarded alimony to her, might well have retracted, de-
claring that it had not known this fact. In light of the absence of a
retraction, a court could have viewed the defendant's refusal to re-
tract after learning that the charge was erroneous as supplying the
fault. In other words, courts may or may not infer malice from
whether the defendant offered a retraction.
4. Nonmedia Defendants
Another outstanding question is whether the constitutional
protection of New York Times and Gertz applies to a nonmedia
defendant as well as to a member of the press. On the merits the
answer clearly should be "yes." The first amendment speaks of
"freedom of speech, and of the press." Granting the same protec-
tion to the private individual as to the press will not discriminate
against the press or impair in any way its newly found security.
Instead, to hold that the professional, engaged in the activity as a
business and providing for far wider dissemination than the
ephemeral oral publication of a private individual, is entitled to
greater protection under the first amendment sounds truly anoma-
lous. Similarly, the common law privilege of fair report and the
doctrine of no liability for an expression of mere opinion should
apply to an individual as well as to the media.
Despite this, the authorities leave some uncertainty about the
first amendment protection available to the nonmedia defendant.
New York Times, laying down the knowledge-or-reckless-disregard
standard, was an action not only against a leading member of the
news media, but also against four individuals whose names the ad-
vertisement listed as endorsing the editorial. The Court applied
the same standard of knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity to
both sets of defendants, with the result that the Court held no one
liable. In at least four other cases the Supreme Court applied the
New York Times standard to nonmedia defendants without ex-
pressly adverting to the issue. 8 In the later case of Hutchinson v.
57. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
58. The four cases, presented chronologically, are Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968);
Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264
(1973).
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Proxmire,5e however, the Court declared in a footnote that it never
had decided "whether the New York Times standard can apply to
an individual defendant rather than a media defendant." 60 Hutch-
inson at least raises a doubt about the constitutional protection
afforded nonmedia defendants.
The Supreme Court also has failed to indicate whether the
Gertz standard of negligence for private plaintiffs applies to
nonmedia defendants. State cases are divided, but a majority of
state courts have applied the Gertz standard to nonmedia defen-
dants. 1 Other courts, oddly enough, want to revive the strict liabil-
ity rule and apply it to nonmedia defendants, even though courts
under the traditional common law had applied strict liability only
against media defendants.
III. INVASION OF PRIVACY
The tort of invasion of privacy concerns the newsgathering as
well as the publication aspects of the investigative reporter's activi-
ties. Unreasonable invasion of the right of privacy developed in the
current century.62 Early cases carried long discourses on whether
the courts should recognize the tort at all; but a majority of the
states recognized the tort fairly quickly. Today all but two or three
of the states recognize the tort, and those states may join the
59. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
60. Id. at 133-34 n.16.
61. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brown, 339 So. 2d 577 (Ala. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954
(1977); Millsaps v. Bankers Life Co., 35 IMI. App. 3d 735, 342 N.E.2d 329 (Law Div. 1976);
Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Rogozinski v. Airstream by
Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133, 377 A.2d 807 (Law Div. 1977), modified on other grounds, 164
N.J. Super. 465, 397 A.2d 334 (App. Div. 1979); Ryder Truck Rentals v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d
334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). But see Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978); Harley-
Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359 (1977); Greenmoss Build-
ers v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414 (Vt.), cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 389 (1983). The
last case was overruled in another respect in Lent v. Huntoon, 470 A.2d 1162 (Vt. 1983).
Some of these cases concern the actual-damages rule of Gertz rather than the strict-liability
rule.
62. Observers commonly ascribe its origin to the law review article, Warren & Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). The New York Court of Appeals, in
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), first gave express
judicial consideration to whether a tort action for invasion of the right of privacy exists. The
majority declined to recognize the tort, although there was a strong dissenting opinion. The
legislature quickly passed a statute to cover the situation of commercial appropriation of
name or likeness.
Three years after Roberson, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905), judicially recognized a common law action.
Other states since have fallen in line.
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others soon. 3
It is now generally recognized that four separate torts consti-
tute the concept of invasion of the right of privacy. These torts are:
(1) appropriation of name or likeness of another; (2) unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (3) unreasonable publicity
given to another's private life; and (4) publicity unreasonably plac-
ing another in a false light before the public.6 4 Considerable over-
lap between the four exists, but significant differences necessitate
treating them separately.
A. Appropriation
The courts first expressly recognized the tort of appropriation
of the name or likeness of another.65 This tort usually concerns
some commercial exploitation of the plaintiff's name or likeness, or
some other aspect of his personality or background. The appropri-
ation, however, need not be for a commercial purpose.66 If the
plaintiff is himself newsworthy or participates in a newsworthy
event and the media treat him as a matter of news, there is no
tortious appropriation. Similar treatment apparently is given to a
biography or feature article regarding the plaintiff.67 Although
newspapers, magazines, and books are published for the purpose of
making money, no appropriation is considered to occur, commer-
cial or otherwise. This form of invasion of privacy, therefore, has
no particular relationship to the tort liability of investigative
reporters.68
63. In the great majority of states, the courts have recognized the tort; two or three
states have statutes. Reception of the tort in other common law countries has not been as
enthusiastic.
64. Dean Prosser presented this breakdown into four disparate torts in Prosser, Pri-
vacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). The Second Restatement adopted the Prosser approach.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-6521 (1976). A large number of cases have uti-
lized the approach.
65. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). On this
form of the invasion of privacy tort, see Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Por-
trayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979); Gordon, Right of Property in
Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 553 (1960); Treece, Commer-
cial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 Tax. L. REv. 637 (1973).
66. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 82 So. 2d 61 (La. Ct.
App. 1955) (advertising in plaintiff's name for witnesses to an accident); Vanderbilt v.
Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907) (using plaintiff's name as father of child in birth
certificate); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (plaintiff's name
signed to telegram petition to governor).
67. False statements about the plaintiff may trigger the tort of defamation or false-
light privacy.
68. Instead of invasion of right of privacy, this invasion often constitutes a misappro-
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B. Intrusion
The second form of privacy violation, intrusion on the seclu-
sion of another, 9 applies to the newsgathering aspect of investiga-
tive reporting and, therefore, does not require publication for the
action to lie.70 According to the Restatement, one is "subject to
liability," if he "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, . .. [and] the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person."'
'1
As the Restatement indicates, the intrusion-privacy tort in-
cludes both physical and figurative forms. Physical intrusion may
take the form of trespass-for example, when one enters another's
home without consent or privilege.72 Another form of physical in-
priation of a "right of publicity." Many plaintiffs are prominent individuals able to sell an
endorsement, charge for an interview, or otherwise profit from the appropriation that the
defendant has committed. They are not suing because of damage to their privacy, but to
insure that they receive suitable pay. This suit attempts to protect a property interest
rather than a dignitary personal interest and is frequently in restitution rather than tort.
See, e.g., Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A "Haystack in a Hurricane," 55 TEMP. L.Q. 977
(1982); Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEm'. PROBS. 202 (1954); Note, The
Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123 (1953); Recent Decision, 41
GEo. L.J. 583 (1953). A Supreme Court case on this type of action is Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (TV station takes film of plaintiff's perform-
ance as "human cannonball" and puts it on a newscast).
69. For various discussions of this form of invasion of privacy tort, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 807-09
(4th ed. 1971); Ezer, Intrusion on Solitude: Herein of Civil Rights and Civil Wrongs, 21
LAW IN TRANSITION 63 (1961); Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest
for a Remedy, 57 GEo. L.J. 509 (1969); Comment, The Emerging Tort of Intrusion, 55 IowA
L. REv. 718 (1970); Recent Cases, 17 VAD. L. REv. 1342 (1964); 5 ARK. L. REv. 388 (1951).
For a comprehensive treatment of intrusion-privacy as it applies to newsgathering, see
Lee, Privacy Intrusions While Gathering News: An Accommodation of Competing Inter-
ests, 64 IowA L. REv. 1243 (1979).
70. E.g., McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810
(1939); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Roach v. Harper, 143 W.
Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976) (Comment d says that the inter-
ference with plaintiff's seclusion must be substantial.). For the requirement that the intru-
sion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person, see Froelich v. Werbin, 219 Kan. 461,
548 P.2d 482 (1976); Munley v. ISC Financial House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1978); Mc-
Lain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 271 Or. 549, 533 P.2d 343 (1975). What is highly offensive to a
reasonable person may be a question for the jury. Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So.
2d 715, 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). On the other hand, the court may decide this issue.
See, e.g., Stiison v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 28 Cal. App. 3d 270, 104 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 952 (1973).
72. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1961), cert. denied, 147 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1962) (search of home without warrant); Welsh v.
Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (landlord moving in on tenant); see also infra
note 106.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:301
trusion on privacy occurs when the defendant obtains consent to
enter a home by means of fraud or trickery.7 3 Physical intrusion
also includes unwarranted entry into a place of temporary seclu-
sion, such as a hotel room,7 4 unwarranted search of one's person or
belongings, such as a purse, wallet, or package, 5 and the improper
opening and reading of a private letter.76
Indirect or figurative intrusions constituting privacy violations
include peering into windows,7 continuing the shouting of threats
or insults into a person's home or mailing repeated threatening let-
ters to the home, 8 and eavesdropping, especially by electronic
means or by wiretapping.79 The tort generally does not apply to
activities like the taking of photographs in public places;8" it may
lie, however, if the conduct is distinctly harassing and persistent,
or if the photograph is under especially embarrassing circum-
stances.2 Oppressive methods of surveillance s or debt collection8 '
73. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Nobel v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973).
74. See, e.g., Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905 (1924) (bedroom on
steamboat); Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbertt, 27 Ga. App. 365, 108 S.E. 309 (1921) (hotel
room); cf. Froelich v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 516 P.2d 993 (1973) (hospital orderly persuaded
to obtain samples of plaintiff's hair from a hair brush and a piece of adhesive tape to which
the plaintiff's hair was attached); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942)
(hospital room).
75. See, e.g., Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959); Sutherland v. Kroger
Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959).
76. See Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976); Birnbaum v. United States, 436
F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), modified on other grounds, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978).
77. See Alabama Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Partridge, 284 Ala. 442, 225 So. 2d 848 (1969)
(binoculars and camera); Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App.
1956).
78. See Pritchett v. Board of Comm'rs, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N.E. 32 (1908) (profanity
from jail next door); Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390 (N.Y. 1851).
79. See Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931); see also Elson v. Bowen,
83 Nev. 515, 436 P.2d 12 (1967); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964);
Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E. 2d 564 (1958).
The action may lie although the information obtained is not used, Fowler v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965), and is not published. Contra Corcoran v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
80. See, e.g., Man v. Warner Bros., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Berg v. Minneap-
olis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40
Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 446 (1953) (embracing wife in public market); De Lury v. Kretchmer,
66 Misc. 2d 897, 322 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
81. The classic case is Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973), in which the
court enjoined a photographer who had seriously harassed Jacqueline Onassis and her chil-
dren. See also Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956); cf. Harms v. Miami
Daily News, 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (newspaper column invited people to
call plaintiff if they wanted to hear a sexy voice).
82. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1969) (plain-
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also may come within the scope of intrusion, although these viola-
tions usually produce other tort actions. Finally, the intrusion form
of invasion of privacy has expanded to cover improper attempts to
pry into private affairs, such as efforts to obtain the balance of
plaintiff's private bank account"5 or to obtain the information in an
income tax return. 6 This extension does not apply to the inspec-
tion of public records, but could apply to the wrongful acquisition
of access to private records, not available to the public. Unreasona-
ble intrusion, therefore, might apply to wrongful use of a computer
to gain access to a private computer system of information.
C. Publicity
The third form of the tort of invasion of privacy is the unrea-
sonable giving of publicity 7 to true facts about the plaintiff's life.
The statements being true, an action for defamation will not lie.""
The plaintiff thus brings this action not for injury to reputation,
but for mental and emotional distress. The objectionable true facts
tiff photographed in "Fun-House," where unexpected jet of air raised her dress over her
head). Contra Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (football player photo-
graphed with his consent, but without his knowledge that his fly was open, denied recovery).
83. See Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132 S.E.2d 119
(1963); Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1956); Moore v.
New York Elevated R.R. Co., 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892); see also Chappell v. Stewart,
82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542 (1896).
84. See Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950); Duty v.
General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954); Berger, The Bill Collector and the
Law-A Special Tort, at Least For a While, 17 DE PAuL L. REV. 327 (1968).
85. See Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936); State ex rel. Clemens v.
Witthaus, 360 Mo. 274, 228 S.W.2d 4 (1950) (overturned discovery order for "any and all
letters, manuscripts and other documents"); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34
(1929). In these cases, defendants sought to obtain information through inappropriate con-
duct. On the other hand, courts have held mere inquiries of neighbors about the plaintiff's
financial condition not actionable. See, e.g., Munley v. ISC Financial House, Inc., 584 P.2d
1336 (Okla. 1978).
86. See Frey v. Dixon, 141 N.J. Eq. 481, 58 A.2d 86 (N.J. Ch. 1948) (invalid court
order for production of tax returns); cf. Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80
(N.J. Ch. 1940) (refused to authorize compulsory blood test), disapproved in Cortese v.
Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950).
87. Defamation requires publication to only one person. Publication to one person also
may be sufficient for this form of invasion of the right of privacy; the cases, however, are not
clear. The Restatement uses the term "publicity" when referring to this and the false-light
forms of invasion of privacy. The distinction is not important for the investigative reporter,
whose "publications" are normally in a form of news medium and, therefore, amount to
"publicity."
88. At one time a criminal prosecution for libel might lie, but courts now regard the
Constitution as precluding this. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Farnsworth v.
Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
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(1) must pertain to matters not of general knowledge and must be
so embarrassing that the publicity would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person; and (2) must be not of legitimate public con-
cern.89 Consistent with the latter requirement, the early cases
made clear that no recovery exists for publicity given to facts that
customarily are regarded as newsworthy and proper subjects of
public concern. The status of the plaintiff as a public official or
public figure is, therefore, a significant consideration in determin-
ing what information is newsworthy and not actionable.90
From the constitutional standpoint, the only Supreme Court
case directly on point is Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.9 1 This
case held specifically that the first amendment does not permit a
publicity action to lie against a television broadcaster that dis-
closes the name of a rape victim9" when an indictment and the trial
record of certain accused persons already have disclosed the name.
The Court found, quoting the Restatement, that "[t]here is no lia-
bility when the defendant merely gives further publicity to infor-
mation about the plaintiff which is already public. Thus, there is
no liability for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiff's life
which are matters of public record."'93 The Court proceeded to
adopt the second sentence as a matter of constitutional law.
The Court abstained from giving any further indication of
whether this form of action for invasion of the right of privacy is
actionable at all under the Constitution, and, if actionable, the re-
strictions that apply. The opinion in Cox, however, plus the hold-
ings in three Supreme Court cases concerning the right of privacy
and other forms of invasion,94 suggest that the Court will be willing
to recognize the action for embarrassing publicity sometime in the
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976); W. PROSSER, supra note 69,
at 809-12; Hill, supra note 51, at 1255-69, 1286-90; Prosser, supra note 64, at 392-98; Swan,
Publicity Invasion of Privacy: Constitutional and Doctrinal Difficulties With a Developing
Tort, 58 OR. L. REv. 483 (1980).
90. For citations, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS App. § 652D reporter's notes
(1976).
91. 420 U.S. 569 (1975).
92. Although a state statute existed making it a crime to disclose the name, the state
supreme court held that the civil action for invasion of privacy was a matter of the state
common law on the right of privacy. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 200 S.E.2d
127 (1973).
93. 420 U.S. at 494 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment c
(Tent. Draft no. 13, 1967)). The provision is now in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652D comment b (1976).
94. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (commer-
cial appropriation); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1974)
(false-light privacy); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1967) (false-light privacy).
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future.9 The possibility remains, however, that the Court may find
that the test for liability contains too many ambiguous expressions
incapable of precise definition and, thus, may lead to ad hoc deci-
sions that produce numerous appeals and result in undesirable
self-censorship.9
The tort of embarrassing publicity raises some more generic
questions that a single authoritative decision probably could settle.
For example, can a public official, particularly an important one,
have any aspect of his life so private that it is not a matter of
legitimate public concern? 97 Should the courts treat a public offi-
cial differently from a public figure? What if either of them now
has retired from public activities, and is leading a very private life?
A second unsettled question is how far an investigative re-
porter can delve into the past and publicize discoveries. Suppose a
newsworthy event occurred many years ago and a participant has
moved to a different location, and now is living a private life under
a different name. Is it actionable to recall the earlier occurrence
and identify the participant? If the event is a matter of public re-
cord or was of widespread knowledge and interest at the time, the
media, of course, may revive the event as a historical presentation.
Whether or not the media may identify the plaintiff, however, is a
different matter 9"-and one that requires Supreme Court action
95. Two recent decisions have carefully studied the matter and concluded that the
embarrassing publicity tort is constitutional. The first was the California case of Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 540-41, 483 P.2d 34, 42-43, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 874-75
(1971) (decided before Cox); the second was the Ninth Circuit case of Virgil v. Time, Inc.,
527 F.2d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1975) (certiorari denied
after Cox).
96. This was a primary reason why the Supreme Court repudiated its plurality opinion
of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974). See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
97. Suppose, for example, that the mayor of the city has a private collection of porno-
graphic pictures in his home, or that he and his wife occasionally engage in bitter disputes
and he sometimes strikes her in anger, or that he has an embarrassing disease-none of
which is known to the public.
In Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Co., 60 IlI. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d 126 (1978), a
policeman engaged in undercover work, viewing a "deluxe" lingerie show, was filmed in an
embarrassing situation, and the film was broadcast. As a public officer engaged in duty, he
was held not able to recover. Id. at 839, 377 N.E.2d at 131-32.
98. The courts have disagreed on whether publication is actionable under these cir-
cumstances. In Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931), following a famous
murder trial of plaintiff in which she was aquitted, plaintiff married and moved to another
state. Defendant produced a motion picture, The Red Kimono, based on plaintiff's exper-
iences, using her true name and advertising the film as a true account. The court held for
plaintiff based on a privacy action for publicity. Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93-94. In Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971), plaintiff partici-
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for resolution, at least from the constitutional standpoint.
D. False Light
The fourth and final form of invasion of the right of privacy is
the publication of a statement about the plaintiff that places him
in a false light before the public.9  This form of privacy invasion is
like defamation; indeed, it may provide an alternative remedy for a
defamatory publication.100 The primary significance of a false light
action, however, exists when the false statement or implication is
not defamatory in nature and this action is the only remedy
available.
The attributes of a false light action are derived from the fea-
tures of both an action for defamation and the standards for inva-
sion-of-privacy actions. The primary basis of the recovery mirrors
privacy actions. In defamation, the plaintiff recovers for damage to
reputation; in false light, the plaintiff recovers for mental distress
and injury to sensibilities. Some objective standard for determin-
ing an actionable injury must exist, and courts have utilized the
usual privacy standard of "highly offensive to a reasonable per-
pated in a hijacking episode in his youth. He was convicted, served his sentence, moved
from Kentucky to California, and lived as a responsible family man for many years when the
Reader's Digest published an article on hijacking in which it referred to plaintiff by name.
The court again held for plaintiff. Id. at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr at 876.
On the other hand, Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940), concerned a famous child prodigy in mathematics who disap-
peared from public view and became an ordinary accountant with a pathetic desire for ob-
scurity. The New Yorker discovered the plaintiff years later and published a "profile" on
him entitled "April Fool." The court denied recovery. Id. at 811. Street v. National Broad-
casting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S.
1095 (1981), concerned an NBC "documentary" on the famous Scottsboro rape trials of the
1930's. Victoria Price Street, the prosecuting witness in the case, was thought to be dead,
but she appeared and contended that NBC defamed her and invaded her right of privacy.
Despite this, NBC broadcast the documentary again. Failing to recover in the trial court
and the court of appeals, she sought and obtained certiorari from the Supreme Court. Id. at
1236-37. The Court dismissed the case, however, when the parties reached a settlement See
454 U.S. 1095 (1981). Accord, Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 56 Del. 67, 189 A.2d 773 (1963).
Finally, the discussion of this form of invasion of privacy assumes that the reporter
obtained the information that he is publishing in a legal manner. A discussion of what the
court should do if the defendant obtained the information wrongfully appears in this Article
at notes 105-69 and accompanying text.
99. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976); W. PROSSER, supra
note 69, at 812-18; Prosser, supra note 64, at 422; Wade, Defamation and the Right of
Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1962); Note, The Ambush Interview: A False Light Inva-
sion of Privacy?, 34 CASE W. RES. 72 (1983).
100. The plaintiff, however, cannot recover double damages by bringing both actions.
Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wash. 2d 253, 259, 396 P.2d 793, 797 (1964).
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son."101 On the other hand, the falsity aspect of the tort means
that the constitutional requirement of fault regarding falsity in
defamation suits is pertinent. The Supreme Court expressly recog-
nized its pertinence in Time, Inc. v. Hill'02 by adopting the New
York Times standard of knowledge-or-reckless-disregard for fal-
sity. Four years later, a plurality of the Court in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. adopted the same standard for application in
defamation actions concerning matters of public or general inter-
est, but then a majority in Gertz repudiated the Rosenbloom deci-
sion by adopting the equivalent of a negligence standard for pri-
vate plaintiffs.
Most authorities were inclined to believe that when the oppor-
tunity arose, the Supreme Court, therefore, would modify the hold-
ing in Hill and adopt instead the public-private plaintiff dichot-
omy of Gertz in false light cases. In Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 03 however, a case concerning a private plaintiff,
the Court held that the lower court properly found the defendant
guilty of reckless disregard toward the falsity of some statements.
The lower court's finding satisfied the New York Times standard,
which the Supreme Court regarded as sufficient to decide the case.
Thus, the applicability of the Gertz standard of negligence for pri-
vate plaintiffs in false light cases remains open.
04
101. For representative cases, see Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d
Cir. 1951) (illustration 8 in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976)); Strickler v.
National Broadcsting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (illustration 9 in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976)); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905)
(illustration 7 in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976)); Koussevitzky v. Allen,
Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1947), aff'd, 272 A.D. 759, 69
N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947), appeal denied, 272 A.D. 794, 71 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1947) (illustration 6 in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976)).
102. 385 U.S. 374, 387-91 (1967). A play, The Desperate Hours, which was based on an
actual event in which escaping prisoners occupied a home for some time, portrayed some
events not in accordance with the actual occurrence. Subsequently, Life magazine had a
layout, with pictures of the actors and actual characters, indicating that the play was accu-
rate. A holding for the plaintiffs was reversed and the case was sent back for a new trial. Id.
at 398.
103. 419 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1974).
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976) (carrying a caveat on the
matter). In Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850-56 (D. Kan. 1977), the court in a privacy
case applied the Gertz public-private distinction. The Supreme Court may hold that since
the interests at stake in privacy are different from those in defamation, the Gertz distinc-
tion need not apply. My personal opinion, however, is that the Court ultimately will decide
that the Gertz rule for private plaintiffs applies in privacy actions.
1984]
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IV. OTHER TORT ACTIONS
Like the intrusion form of invasion of the right of privacy, the
torts discussed in this section concern conduct of a reporter en-
gaged in discovering and collecting information, or "newsgather-
ing." The discussion of these torts does not give consideration to
the possible liability for subsequent publication of the information,
which will be treated in part V of this Article.
A. Tortious Entry on Real Property
Tortious entry on real property, or trespass, overlaps the in-
trusion form of invasion of privacy but is of much earlier origin
and is more precise in its attributes. One who surreptitiously en-
ters a home or an office is liable for trespass, whether he takes a
tangible object away or obtains information.105 In this respect, the
law treats a reporter like any other citizen; the law does not pro-
vide a privilege for him as a consequence of his profession.106 The
first amendment does not create a constitutional privilege for tres-
pass in newsgathering. 10 7
105. A reporter also is liable for trespass if instead of making the entry himself, he
employs or persuades someone else to enter for him. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
158 comment k (1963). In Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 154-55, 295 N.W.2d 768, 782
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980), a police lieutenant, properly entering a building to investigate a dis-
turbance, was held liable for trespass because he gave consent to a reporter to accompany
him.
106. There are numerous cases in which the courts have held a newsgathering reporter
liable for trespass. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971)
(reporters with hidden camera and recorder entered home of person suspected of illegal
practice of medicine; reporters pretended to be prospective patients); Rafferty v. Hartford
Courant Co., 36 Conn. Supp. 239, 243, 416 A.2d 1215, 1217 (1980) (reporters crashed mock
"unwedding" ceremony); Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 3 Kan. App. 2d 461, 471-72,
596 P.2d 832, 842 (1979) (television film crew accompanied inspection of restaurant by food
inspector; crew liable if obtained consent by fraud); Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., 61 A.D.2d 491, 494-95, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (1978), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d
940 (1979) (CBS film crew crashed restaurant, uninvited, with cameras rolling); Anderson v.
WROC-TV, 109 Misc. 2d 904, 912-13, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 226-27 (1981) (television crew ac-
companied Humane Society inspection of plaintiff's house, despite her objection); Prahl v.
Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 151, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780-81 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (TV reporter
entered private premises relying on consent of police investigating disturbance). But cf.
Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930
(1977) (holding no recovery under a trespass theory due to implied consent by custom). See
also Stahl v. Oklahoma 665 P.2d 839 (Okla. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 973 (1984) (re-
porters accompanied nuclear protestors on nuclear generator site, despite being expressly
forbidden; guilty of criminal trespass).
107. "Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster
when the general public is excluded." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972).
"That right [of free speech] has ... never been held to confer upon the press a constitution-
ally protected right of access to sources of information not available to others." United Press
324
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Of course, a reporter is not liable if he has consent from the
owner or possessor to enter. The consent may be express, or it may
be implied from habits of the parties to the action or general cus-
toms regarding the activity.108 The consent is effective only if
someone who has authority gives the consent. Ordinarily, the po-
lice do not have the authority to consent on behalf of the owner.109
The fact that the reporter mistakenly thinks he has consent is said
not to be sufficient. 110 Finally, if the reporter obtains consent by
fraud, as by impersonation of a police officer or by pretending to
have a search warrant, the consent is vitiated and the entry is a
trespass."'
The common law rule does not require the plaintiff to show
actual damage for recovery. 12 The court may grant nominal dam-
ages. In cases in which the plaintiff sustains actual damages, com-
pensatory damages depend upon the manner and method of the
entry, and punitive damages are permissible in suitable cases. The
ambit of recovery for consequential damages is very broad since
trespass is an intentional tort.118
Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954); see also Tribune Review
Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1958).
"The First Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from
torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not
a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of an-
other's home or office." Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). The
court has applied this trespass prohibition to government property not open to the public
and upheld a $25 fine under a criminal trespassing statute in Stahl v. Oklahoma, 665 P.2d
839 (Okla. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 973 (1984).
108. Under general custom, one calling at a home or office simply to seek information
or ask questions has implied consent and is not guilty of a trespass if he does no more. This
custom would apply to a reporter. The Florida Supreme Court, in Florida Publishing Co. v.
Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 917-19 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977), held that
common custom gives permission to news representatives to enter private premises to report
on events of public interest. Other states, however, have not followed Fletcher, and some
have expressly repudicated it.
109. See, e.g., Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 154, 295 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1980).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 164(b) (1963). The reporter would not be lia-
ble for a harmless intrusion if the mistake was "induced by the conduct of the possessor."
Id. § 164 comment b. Cf. Allen v. Combined Communications Corp., 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
2417 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 22, 1981) (no liability unless reporter knew he was trespassing or
caused damage).
111. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (reporters trespassed by
pretending to be prospective patients and gaining entry to premises of person engaged in
illegal practice of medicine); Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 3 Kan. App. 2d 461, 473-
74, 596 P.2d 832, 844 (1979) (permission to film inspection of restaurant by food inspector
constitutes trespass if reporters obtained consent by misrepresentation).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1963).
113. See Wyant v. Crouse, 127 Mich. 158, 160, 86 N.W. 527, 528 (1901) (trespasser
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B. Tortious Interference with Personal Property
Tortious interference with personal property includes a conge-
ries of tort actions, but there are difficulties about the availability
or adequacy of most of them. Consider first actions stemming from
interference with tangible personal property. Replevin or specific
restitution in equity may lie to recover the chattel. If the defend-
ant already has published a picture or information from abstracted
papers, however, restitution accomplishes nothing for the plaintiff.
Trespass to personal property, unlike trespass to real property, re-
quires actual damage. It lies for minor damages to the property
itself or for temporary deprival of use of that property, and is un-
likely to be available in an action against a reporter. 14 Conversion,
on the other hand, is somewhat more suitable in an action against
a reporter.
Conversion affords compensation for the value of the chattel if
the defendant intentionally claims dominion or exercises such con-
trol over it that he seriously interferes with the rights of the own-
ers. When this is true, the court may justly require the defendant
to pay the full value of the chattel."' In an action against a re-
porter, however, the items claimed to have been converted are not
likely to have inherent value justifying the bringing of a tort ac-
tion. The relief needed is compensation for the injury to the plain-
tiff arising from the publication, and an action for conversion does
not supply that relief. Perhaps it can be argued by analogy to tres-
pass to real property, that courts should treat the injury arising
from the publication as consequential damages and, thus, recover-
able in an action for conversion, but courts are not likely to lend
this argument much credence.
The difficulties with an action for interference with personal
property are exacerbated when the thing "converted" is not in tan-
gible form at all. Suppose that the reporter has taken from a file
the papers containing the information in question, duplicated and
returned them, or has simply read the papers without any duplica-
liable for consequences naturally arising from his trespass); Derosier v. New England Tel. &
Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 461, 130 A. 145, 151 (1925) (applying a rule of reasonable antici-
pation).
114. See generally RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 216-220 (1976) (liability to the
possessor of the chattel conditioned to actual dispossession of the chattel; impairment of the
chattel's condition, quality, or value; deprivation of the possessor's use of the chattel for a
substantial period of time; or bodily harm caused to the possessor or legally protected inter-
est of the possessor).
115. Id. § 222A.
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tion, or has obtained the information over the telephone by imper-
sonating someone. How is it possible to envision a conversion of
the information alone?
116
Some cases have held defendants liable for wrongfully ob-
taining information in this fashion, but the suits were not based on
the tort of conversion. In International News Service v. The Asso-
ciated Press,1 17 the Supreme Court granted an injunction against
defendant INS who wrongfully1 8 obtained news compiled by
plaintiff The Associated Press and supplied the news to its own
customers.1 19 Numerous other cases have granted relief against a
competitor who wrongfully obtained a valuable trade secret held
by another and used it to his own advantage.2 0 These cases, how-
ever, concerned a taking and using of the intangible idea or infor-
116. Unlike the actions for replevin and trespass to chattels, the action for conversion
has been brought against investigative reporters. In Dodd v. Pearson, 279 F. Supp. 101
(D.D.C. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 947 (1969), Senator Thomas Dodd brought suit against Drew Pearson and Jack Ander-
son based on their charges of corruption in their column, The Washington Merry-Go-
Round. The charges ultimately resulted in Dodd's resignation from the Senate. Pearson and
Anderson based their charges on papers that former employees had taken from Dodd's files,
duplicated, and delivered to the defendants. The trial court held that an action for conver-
sion would lie. Id. at 104. The court, however, cited only conversion cases concerning tangi-
ble chattels with inherent value and declared: "What the measure of damages should be and
whether substantial damages may be recovered under the circumstances, is a matter to be
determined at a later stage of this litigation." Id.
The court of appeals reversed the conversion ruling. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969). The appellate court drew a careful distinction
between trespass to chattels and conversion, and held that conversion would not lie because
(1) the plaintiff had not been deprived of his files, and (2) "the information taken from
those files [did not fall] ... under the protection of the law of property, enforceable by a
suit for conversion." Id. at 708.
117. 248 U.S. 215 (1918); see also Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown
Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 383, 192 A.2d 657 (1963) (holding that the tort of unfair competi-
tion includes misappropriation of another's property); Baird, Common Law Intellectual
Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 411 (1983).
118. The defendant was "pirating" the news by bribing employees of newspapers sub-
scribing to AP and inducing breach of contract by some of those newspapers themselves. 248
U.S. at 231.
119. Commentators have sharply criticized the remedy as a prior restraint. If the court
had confined the remedy to damages, the case would have received less criticism.
120. See, e.g., Herold v. Herold China & Pottery Co., 257 F. 911, 913 (6th Cir. 1919);
Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 162-63, 131 N.E.
307, 309 (1921); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 586-87, 314 S.W.2d 763, 776-77, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958); Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Sec. Co., 9 Wash. 2d 45, 64-66, 113
P.2d 845, 854-55 (1941); see also 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR CoMPrrriON, TRADE-
MARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14.02 (4th ed. 1982).
The significance of the trade secret cases for the present purpose is that they recognize
the intangible information as property and give legal protection to it.
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mation for the commercial benefit of the wrongdoer. Plaintiffs
brought suit to obtain compensation for the benefit that the de-
fendant wrongfully obtained, and not solely for the injury that the
plaintiff incurred. Thus, the courts based the remedy on the law of
restitution rather than tort law. Perhaps some day the law by anal-
ogy will develop to the point of recognizing a cause of action for
obtaining information in a fashion that would amount to conver-
sion if it were a tangible chattel of monetary value. Of course, it
has not done this yet. 2'
C. Harm to the Person
Most of the cases in which a reporter's newsgathering activi-
ties have harmed the person of the plaintiff concern the intrusion
form of invasion of the right of privacy. Other specific torts, how-
ever, may come into play. A reporter may subject himself to the
tort of intentional infliction of mental distress 122 by persistent har-
121. Several similar cases provide useful analogies. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (divided Supreme Court declined to enjoin publication of
the Pentagon Papers); Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left
Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STN. L. REv. 311 (1974) (discussion of possible criminal
liability under federal statute for copying Pentagon Papers and seeing that they reached the
news media); see also United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 922-28 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982) (espionage and conversion by copying classified
files); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Efterprises, 557 F. Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y.) (con-
version by copying memoirs), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 79-80 (D.D.C. 1979) (copies made of government
papers constituted theft).
Somewhat more on point is the California courts' treatment of a criminal statute on
receiving stolen property. In People v. Kunkin, 100 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1972), rev'd and vacated,
9 Cal. 3d 245, 507 P.2d 1392, 107 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1973), an employee of the state attorney
general's office stole a roster of the personnel of the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, in-
cluding names, addresses, and telephone numbers of 80 undercover narcotic agents, and
offered to lend it to the Los Angeles Free Press. The Press took it and printed the details
about the undercover agents. The majority opinion of the court of appeals, affirming the
convictions of employees of the paper, thoroughly treated the nature of property, 100 Cal.
Rptr. at 850-51, the effect of photocopying, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52, and the significance of
the fact that the accused were newsmen engaged in newsgathering, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 855-62.
The state supreme court, however, reversed the convictions and vacated the opinion, on
the ground that the statute required "knowledge" that the property was stolen. People v.
Kunkin, 9 Cal. 3d 245, 256, 507 P.2d 1392, 1399-1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 184, 191-92 (1973). The
court held that evidence raising strong suspicion of theft is not sufficient, especially when
the person supplying the roster indicates that he wants it back, since theft requires a spe-
cific intent permanently to deprive the rightful owner of his property. Id. at 254, 507 P.2d at
1398, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1963); Prosser, Insult and Outrage,
44 CALiF. L. REV. 40 (1956); Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4
VAND. L. REv. 63 (1950).
1984] TORT LIABILITY OF REPORTERS
assment 123 or threats of highly unpleasant consequences unless the
plaintiff provides certain information or makes certain admis-
sions.1 24 Harassment also may become a nuisance, private or pub-
lic.12 5 In Davis v. Schuchat,128 a self-styled investigative journalist
seeking information from certain people about the plaintiff, a pub-
lic figure, told them falsely that the plaintiff had been convicted of
a felony in New York. The journalist did this in accordance with
his "admitted technique of 'throwing a lot of things out in an in-
terview just to get a response.'" The court upheld the trial court's
finding of knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity and affirmed
an award of punitive damages for slander.
12 7
D. Inducing Breach of Fiduciary or Confidential Obligation
Certain relationships establish a fiduciary or confidential obli-
gation between the parties. If a person who owes that obliga-
tion-frequently termed the duty of loyalty-acts in violation of it
and acquires a profit or other benefit as a result, the law declares
him to be a constructive trustee, holding the benefit in trust for
the other party.2 This restitutionary remedy may not be particu-
123. See, e.g., Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 794-95, 216 P.2d 571, 572-
73 (1950) (bill collector); Boyle v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592, 596-98, 392 N.E.2d 1053, 1056-57
(1979) (private investigator); Continental Casualty Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 682-83, 161
So. 753, 755 (1935) (insurance adjustor); Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 20, 173
S.W.2d 64-66 (1954) (bill collector).
124. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 206-07, 208 N.W. 814, 815-16
(1926) (school authorities); Janvier v. Sweeney, [1916] 2 K.B. 316 (private detective).
125. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821A-821E (1976) (defining
types of nuisances and who can recover in an action for nuisance). An action for both types
of nuisance might have existed in Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,
487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (action by photographer against president's widow and secret
service agents for false arrest with defendant Onassis' counterclaim seeking injunctive relief
of alleged invasion of privacy occasioned by the photographer's attempt to photograph her
and her children). Only the privacy right, however, received attention.
126. 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
127. Id. at 736, 738. Two arguments of the defendant are worth mentioning. First, the
"First Amendment mandates a complete immunity from liability for a slander made to a
limited number of people by a reporter in the ordinary course of his preparations for a news
story on a subject of general or public interest." Id. at 733. The defendant argued this by
way of analogy to the absolute immunity for judges and legislators; this limited immunity
would provide more protection than New York Times v. Sullivan. Second, "statements
made in private cause less harm and are more easily rebutted than public statements, and
... therefore statements made in private are entitled to greater protection." Id. at 734. The
Davis court responded seriously to these arguments in dismissing them.
128. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 166 (1936). Sometimes the action is at law, in
quasi-contract, for the value of the benefit. Id. § 138.
A recent Supreme Court case illustrates the constructive trust concept in a first amend-
ment context. In Snapp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), defendant Snepp became a
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larly appropriate for use in connection with either a reporter who
simply files a story rather than writes a book, or the newspaper
that publishes the story. The constructive trust cases, however, do
recognize that the defendant's conduct was wrongful, and for
courts to look at this wrongful conduct from the standpoint of the
harm done to the plaintiff rather than the benefit acquired by the
defendant is certainly possible. This viewpoint, of course, would
represent the tort approach, which has sometimes been overlooked
because courts have usually treated cases concerning breach of
fiduciary obligation as controlled by principles of equity. The
breach of a fiduciary obligation, however, also may constitute an
equitable tort. The Restatement of Torts provides that "[o]ne
standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability
to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by
the relation."1"9
The Restatement of Agency reiterates the holding of the con-
structive trust cases that breach of the duty of loyalty is indeed
wrongful:
The agent. . . has a duty not to use information acquired by him as agent or
by means of opportunities which he has as agent to acquire it, or acquired by
him through a breach of duty to the principal, for any purpose likely to cause
his principal harm or to interfere with his business, although it is information
not connected with the subject matter of his agency.130
Numerous cases apply this principle to the relationships that exist
between trustee and beneficiary,131 principal and agent,132 and di-
CIA agent, signing an agreement recognizing that he was undertaking a position of trust in
that agency of the government, and agreeing not to publish any information relating to the
Agency without submitting the information for clearance. In violation of the agreement, he
wrote and published a book on his CIA experiences without submitting it for clearance. The
Supreme Court imposed a constructive trust on his income from the book, declaring that
this "remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a breach of trust. It deals fairly
with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong .... [T]he trust
remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness." Id. at 515. The
Court regarded an injunction as undesirable, if not improper, but did not regard the con-
structive trust as in conflict with the first amendment.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1976); see also Note, Breach of Confi-
dence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1426 (1982). The Note primarily treats cases
in which a disclosure of confidential information occurred. See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First
Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d
668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Blair v. Union Free School Dist., No. 6, 67 Misc. 2d 248, 324
N.Y.S.2d 222 (1971); see also Hill, supra note 51, at 1291-99.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 comment a (1957).
131. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS §§ 201-205 (1957) (trustee is
chargeable with any loss or depreciation in value of trust estate, any profit made by him, or
any profit that would have accrued to the trust if the depreciation or lost profits resulted
from a breach of trust).
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rector and stockholders.133 Other decisions recognize the duty in
such relationships as employer and employee, attorney and client,
and physician and patient to keep confidential certain information
acquired through the relationship."'
One who induces a person under a fiduciary obligation or a
duty to keep certain information confidential to violate the obliga-
tion or duty may be subject to tort liability, irrespective of whether
the person breaching the fiduciary obligation has committed a tort.
Since one who improperly interferes with a contract obligation by
inducing another to break the contract or who improperly inter-
feres with a prospective contractual relation or some other form of
advantageous economic relation is liable for an independent tort,13 5
surely an improper interference with compliance with a fiduciary
obligation also will give rise to liability. Thus, a reporter who in-
duces a person to disclose certain injurious information about an-
other, in violation of the former's fiduciary obligation, may be lia-
ble in tort for his conduct.3 '
A reporter's liability, however, depends on whether the fiduci-
ary's disclosure of confidential information to him is indeed wrong-
ful and a breach of the obligation. The Restatement of Agency
states that
132. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY §§ 403, 407 (1957) (agent's lia-
bility for things received in violation of duty of loyalty and the principal's choice of
remedies).
133. See generally H. HENN, CORPORATIONS §§ 234-241 (3d ed. 1983) (fiduciary duty of
officers and directors not to compete with corporation, not to usurp corporate opportunity,
not to engage in activities that conflict with the interests of the corporation, not to engage in
insider trading, and to exercise unbiased judgment with respect to all shareholders).
134. See Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 710-11, 287 So. 2d 824, 831-32 (1973) (the duty
within the context of physician and patient); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757-759 (1939) (the
treatment of trade secrets within the employer-employee relationship); see also Note, Ac-
tion for Breach of Medical Secrecy Outside the Courtroom, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 103 (1967).
135. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 766, 766B, 774B (1976) (re-
garding contractual relations, prospective contractual relations, and other advantageous re-
lations respectively).
136. Section 874 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts itself says that "[A] person
who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is himself guilty of tor-
tious conduct and is subject to liability for the harm thereby caused." RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 874 comment c (1976). This is the liability of a joint tortfeasor, see infra
note 157, rather than the independent tort liability arising from inducing or causing another
to commit a wrong to the plaintiff, such as inducing him to break a contract. Compare
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 138(2) (1936) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874
(1976).
Suppose in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), that the publisher of the book
had induced Snepp to let it publish the book without submission to the CIA for clearance.
In that case the publisher would have been liable for an independent tort.
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[a]n agent is privileged to reveal information confidentially acquired by him
in the course of his agency in the protection of a superior interest of himself
or of a third person. Thus, if the confidential information is to the effect that
the principal is committing or is about to commit a crime, the agent is under
no duty not to reveal it.
13 7
In addition, the Code of Ethics for Government Service, adopted
by House Concurrent Resolution No. 175, provides in part: "Any
person in Government service should: 1. Put loyalty to the highest
moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party, or
Government Department. . . .9. Expose corruption wherever dis-
covered." 138s Thus, in some circumstances, revelation may not con-
stitute a breach of the obligation-and may not create liability for
inducement. Several cases illustrate when breach of a fiduciary ob-
ligation is not wrongful." 9
E. Fraud and Trickery
A defendant may commit fraud in two ways. First, he may
commit fraud directly on the plaintiff-for example, when the de-
fendant deceives the plaintiff into believing that he is someone
else, entitled to the information,14 ° or when the defendant falsely
tells the plaintiff that he already has the information froni some-
one else and simply wants to discuss it with him, or when the de-
fendant pretends to have legal authority to enter plaintiff's home
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 comment f (1957).
138. 72 Stat. B12 (1958). This Code is set forth in the explanatory notes to 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 7301 (West 1980).
139. See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 947 (1969); see also Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850
(10th Cir. 1972). In Lachman, the defendant, conducting an oil and gas survey for the plain-
tiff under a confidentiality provision in the employment contract, discovered that plaintiff's
oil well was illegally draining from his neighbor's land, and informed the neighbor. Plaintiff
sued for breach of the contract. Holding for defendant, the court said that it is "public
policy in Oklahoma and everywhere to encourage the disclosure of criminal activity, and a
ruling here in accordance with the argument advanced by appellants would serve to frus-
trate this policy." Id. at 853.
See also Willig v. Gold, 75 Cal. App. 2d 809, 171 P.2d 754 (1946). In Willig, the defend-
ant, agent for plaintiff as his real estate broker, learned that plaintiff had been defrauding
his insurance company by undervaluing his business income. Defendant supplied incrimi-
nating information about plaintiff for a "fee" to the insurance company. Plaintiff sought to
recover the fee stemming from the alleged breach of a confidential obligation, but the court
denied recovery, holding that no duty prohibits an agent's disclosure of "his principal's dis-
honest acts to the party prejudicially affected by them." Id. at 814, 171 P.2d at 757.
140. Cf. Zimmermann v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) (defendant served upon
plaintiffs' brokers a summons to produce information; summons unreasonable); Brex v.
Smith, 104 N.J. 386, 146 A. 34 (1929) (prosecutor inappropriately sought to examine all
bank accounts of all members of the Newark police department).
1984] TORT LIABILITY OF REPORTERS 333
and search.141 Second, the defendant may exercise similar fraud on
a third party to obtain information about the plaintiff. 14 2 The
fraud may be the direct basis for the wrongful conduct, or, if the
defendant acts fraudulently to obtain consent, the fraud may viti-
ate the consent as a defense for otherwise tortious conduct.
143
F. Threats, Bribery, and Abuse of Process
The use of threats, bribery, or abuse of process also can lead
to reportorial liability. The defendant-reporter may threaten to
publish a far worse story if he is not supplied the true one. Threats
141. Cf. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (reporters entering
premises pretending to be patients).
142. Suppose, for example, that the defendant, seeking to ascertain the balance in
plaintiff's bank account, deceives the bank's employees into thinking that he is the plaintiff.
143. If the action is brought directly for the fraudulent conduct, it would normally be
brought for the tort of deceit, although it could possibly be brought for negligent
misrepresentation.
On fraud as vitiating consent, see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2)
(1976); Fischer, Fraudulently Induced Consent to Intentional Torts, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 71
(1977). See also Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). The problems con-
cerning fraud vitiating consent are analogous to the problems arising in criminal law when
police induce a suspect's confession by misrepresentations. The constitutional due process
ramifications, however, complicate matters in the criminal context. Clearly no per se rule
exists that police fraud or trickery requires an exclusion of the confession. See Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (holding no error in the admission of a confession in a criminal
context). On the other hand, if the effect of the fraud is to deprive the suspect of his rights
under the fifth or sixth amendment, as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), then to admit the confession in as evi-
dence is error. The Supreme Court's customary practice is to look at the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the questioning and to determine whether the confession was
"voluntary." For examples of cases in which courts have attempted to make this determina-
tion, see Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (false statement that suspect's finger-
prints had been found-confession admissible); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (police
falsely told suspect that a cosuspect had implicated him and suggested that victim had
started the altercation by making homosexual advances; these police actions induced the
petitioner's confession, which the Court held to be admissible); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959) (suspect told his friend, a police officer, about a homicide he had committed; the
friend pretended that he was in danger of losing his job, in order to induce suspect to con-
fess and the Court excluded the confession); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (after
psychiatrist, trained in hypnosis, conferred with suspect while pretending to be medical doc-
tor treating sinusitis the Court excluded the confession); United States ex rel. Hall v. Direc-
tor, Dep't of Corrections, 578 F.2d 194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978) (suspect
confessed after police deceived him into believing his accomplices had confessed and impli-
cated him-court found no significance that deceit was deliberate and held confession ad-
missible); Robinson v. Smith, 451 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (after forged confession by
cosuspect together with statement that only way to avoid death penalty was to confess in-
duced defendant's confession, the court excluded the confession); State v. Cooper, 217
N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1974) (after suspect deceived into thinking victim merely hurt, not killed,
confession admissible). See generally White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confession, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 581 (1979).
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of physical force, of criminal prosecutions, or of civil litigation also
constitute tortious conduct.""' The reporter additionally may resort
to bribery, paying someone to do something that is itself wrongful.
This conduct, of course, subjects the wrongdoer to criminal
liability. 45
Abuse of process refers to the intentional use for an improper
purpose of a legal process connected with litigation."" A current
disagreement exists over the propriety of certain uses of the dis-
covery process. In the recent case of Rhinehart v. Seattle Times
Co.,1 47 the newspaper, sued for defamation and invasion of privacy,
sought discovery of certain information from the plaintiff. The
trial court granted the discovery motion, but also issued a protec-
tive order limiting to trial purposes the uses to which the newspa-
per-defendant could put the information. Contending that this
protective order amounted to unconstitutional prior restraint, the
newspaper appealed to the state supreme court, which affirmed en
banc by a divided court. The supreme court might have avoided
the serious hassle regarding prior restraint if it had declared that
the discovery process was established for the purpose of aiding the
parties to prepare for and conduct the trial in an informed fashion
and not for the purpose of obtaining information to publish to the
world. The court then could have dismissed the prior restraint ar-
gument and pointed out that the protective order merely served to
protect the defendant from a potential tort action for abuse of
process.
G. Illegal or Wrongful Conduct in General
As to unlawful acts in general, the case of McCall v. Orville
Mercury4 8 almost came to a clear decision. A California statute
proved that "[a]ny person, except those specifically referred to in
Section 1070 of the Evidence Code, who, knowing he is not author-
ized by law to receive a record or information obtained from a re-
cord, knowingly buys, receives or possesses the record or informa-
144. For the Restatement's treatment of predatory wrongful conduct of this type, see
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 767 comment c (1976).
145. The scope of the original crime of bribery was confined to payments to a govern-
ment officer to induce corrupt conduct.
146. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1976); Bretz, Abuse of
Process-A Misunderstood Concept, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 401 (1971).
147. 98 Wash. 2d 726, 654 P.2d 673 (1982), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983); see also
Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d
176 (D.C. Cir. 1979). For Supreme Court action in Rhinehart, see infra note 198.
148. 142 Cal. App. 3d 805, 191 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1983).
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tion is guilty of a misdemeanor." '149 Defendant newspaper
published plaintiff's criminal record. Its claim of a constitutional
privilege to publish was refuted by citing the statute to claim that
defendant acquired the information by criminal conduct. But the
court side-stepped the problem by construing the exception clause
in the statute to refer to newspapers and their employees. 150 The
implication is clear that if it had not been for the exception clause,
liability would have been imposed under the statute.
On wrongful conduct in general, an analogous situation may
have significance. In the first Restatement of Torts, section 759
provides: "One who, for the purpose of advancing a rival business
interest, procures by improper means information about another's
business is liable to the other for the harm caused by his posses-
sion, disclosure or use of the information. '1 51 Comment c defines
improper means as follows:
Among the means which are improper are theft, trespass, bribing or other-
wise inducing employees or others to reveal the information in breach of
duty, fraudulent misrepresentation, threats of harm by unlawful conduct,
wire-tapping, procuring one's own employees or agents to become employees
of the other for purposes of espionage, and so forth.
5 2
H. Liability for the Tortious Conduct of Another
This final category does not constitute a separate tort, but ap-
plies to all torts. For example, if one person directs his agent or
employee to perform a tortious act, he is himself liable for the
149. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11143 (West 1982).
150. The reference was to the California Confidential Source Statute.
151. RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 759 (1939). This and other sections on the subject of
trade practices were omitted from the Second Restatement as being more appropriate to
treat in a separate restatement.
152. Similar provisions are found in § 757 (trade secrets) of the First Restatement,
especially comment f. In the Second Restatement, Chapter 37 on interference with contrac-
tual relations is very pertinent. The defendant's conduct may give rise to liability, not only
when it is otherwise tortious, but also when it is "improper." Section 767 of the Second
Restatement treats the question of when it is improper. Comment c deals specifically with
the nature of the actor's conduct. Comment j summarizes the factors to be taken into con-
sideration in determining when the conduct is improper. It states that "[riecognized stan-
dards of business ethics and business customs and practices are pertinent, and consideration
is given to concepts of fair play and whether the defendant's interference is not 'sanctioned
by the "rules of the game."' " The relevance to journalistic ethics and customs is apparent.
The double quote is taken from Sustick v. Slatina, 48 N.J. Super. 134, 144, 137 A.2d 54, 60
(1957). See also Leonard Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael L. Field & Co., 516 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.
1975); Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 56 Cal. 2d 202, 363 P.2d 310, 14 Cal. Rptr. 294
(1961) (rules of national conference committee on adjusters).
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tort. 5 ' A principal or employer also may be vicariously liable if the
agent or employee commits a tortious act not at the direction of
the employer, but within the general scope of his employment.1
5 4
Even in the absence of an agency relationship, if one intentionally
induces or otherwise intentionally'55 causes another to do a wrong-
ful'56 act harmful to a third party, the first person may be liable to
the injured party for the harm incurred.
When two or more persons act in concert in performing a tor-
tious act, each is liable, not only for his own action, but also for the
acts of the other. 5 7 "Parties are acting in concert when they act in
accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of
conduct or to accomplish a particular result. The agreement need
not be expressed in words and may be implied and understood to
exist from the conduct itself. 1 58 Some cases indicate that the con-
cept of concert is broad enough to include persons who further the
common plan or tacit agreement by cooperation or request, 5 9 or
lend encouragement to the actor, °60 or ratify the acts and make use
of the benefit from them.'' Some courts have found liability even
when a defendant engages in certain conduct, knowing that others
are also engaging in that conduct.'62
153. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 212 (1957).
154. Id. §§ 216, 219.
155. "Intent" is used to mean that the actor either "desires to cause [the] conse-
quences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to
result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1963).
156. The term "wrongful" indicates that the other party's conduct need not be tor-
tious in itself. Thus, when an actor induces the other party to break his contract, the other
has not necessarily committed a tort; the actor, however, has. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 877(b) (1976).
157. Id. § 876 (1979); see Smithson v. Garth, 3 Lev. 324, 83 Eng. Rep. 711 (1691). In
the Smithson case three persons, acting in concert, set upon the plaintiff. One held him
(false imprisonment), a second battered him, and the third stole his silver buttons. The
court held each liable for the entire damages.
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 comment a (1976). The classic illustration
is that of two persons who get into a drag race without any express agreement. See
Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968); Ogel v. Avina, 33 Wis. 2d 125, 146 N.W. 2d
422 (1966).
159. E.g., Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Karpel, 233 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1956) (trespass);
Johnson v. Sartain, 46 Hawaii 112, 375 P.2d 229 (1962) (battery).
160. E.g., Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950) (battery); Thomas v.
Doorley, 175 Cal. App. 2d 545, 346 P.2d 49 (1959) (battery).
161. E.g., Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87, 196 P. 25 (1921) (diversion of flood
waters); McBryde v. Coggins-McIntosh Lumber Co., 246 N.C. 415, 98 S.E.2d 663 (1957)
(consenting to a trespass for one's own benefit); Stull v. Porter, 100 Or. 514, 196 P. 1116
(1921) (killing plaintiff's dogs).
162. See Moses v. Town of Morgantown, 192 N.C. 102, 133 S.E. 421 (1926) (stream
pollution). Some of the products liability cases concerning DES pills are also relevant. See,
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To think of situations in which the conduct of an investigative
reporter could come within the scope of these cases is easy. Indeed,
several cases exist in which courts have determined the liability of
reporters for the tortious conduct of another or for acting in con-
cert with another. In Pearson v. Dodd,'"3 the trial court found that
two former employees of [Senator Dodd], at times with the assistance of two
members of [his] staff, entered [his] offices without authority and unbe-
knownst to him, removed numerous documents from his files, made copies of
them, replaced the originals, and turned over the copies to the defendant,
Anderson, who was aware of the manner in which the copies had been
obtained.164
The court could have held Anderson, the reporter, liable for inten-
tionally inducing, or tacitly agreeing to cooperate with, the wrong-
ful conduct of Dodd's former employees and staff. That wrongful
conduct could have been held to involve a ratification of an intru-
sion on privacy, a breach of confidence, and perhaps a trespass.
The court, however, found no liability.
A different result was reached in Barber v. Time, Inc.165 Plain-
tiff was in a hospital for tests and treatment of a malady causing
her to eat constantly. She refused to have a picture taken when
interviewed by reporters, but one reporter took a picture surrepti-
tiously while the other was talking to her. The story, with the pic-
ture, appeared in several publications. Time magazine verified the
story and, assuming that plaintiff had given consent for the pic-
ture, carried her picture with an item about her, entitled "Starving
Glutton." In her suit for invasion of privacy, the trial court
awarded $1,500 compensatory damages and $1,500 punitive dam-
e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979), afrd, 343 N.W. 2d 164
(Mich. 1984); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981), aff'd, 55
N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982); cf. Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis.
2d 166, 342 N.W. 2d 37 (1984).
163. 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1967), afl'g and rev'g Dodd v.
Pearson, 279 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1968); see also Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 261 F.
Supp. 726 (D.D.C. 1966).
164. 297 F. Supp. at 102; see also 410 F.2d at 705 & n.20. Indeed, in his syndicated
column in late April 1966, shortly before other columns disclosed details of the documents,
Drew Pearson wrote:
These witnesses are clean cut young men and women who believe senators are not
above the law and that it should not be against the law to document corruption charges
against a U.S. senator. They are not disgruntled employees who came running up with
information against their boss. We sought them out; it took weeks to persuade them
that their first loyalty should be to their country, not to Dodd.
Washington Post, Apr. 25, 1966, at B9, col. 9; see also J. BoYD, ABOVE THE LAW 115 (1969)
(written by one of the employees). Leads to these last two references came from Comment,
The Emerging Tort of Intrusion, 55 IOWA L. Rav. 718, 723 nn.57-58 (1970).
165. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
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ages. The state supreme court affirmed the compensatory damages,
but required a remittitur for the punitive damages."6
One may, perhaps, reconcile the Pearson and Barber cases on
the basis of the nature of the publication and its importance as a
matter of public interest. Senator Dodd's derelictions as United
States Senator were a matter of obvious public interest. On the
other hand, even if the nature of Mrs. Barber's illness could be
considered of public interest she certainly was entitled to privacy
from photographers while in her hospital bed. Neither case, how-
ever, gives a clear indication of the appropriate application of the
concept of concert of action to reportorial activities.
As a final note, Prahl v. Brosamle1 67 presents a different twist
for persons who attempt to work with reporters. In Prahl, police
arrived at a scene to investigate charges that someone in a building
was firing shots at young boys. The police called the owner out,
and then a delegation went in with him to search. The police lieu-
tenant authorized a newscaster to enter with the police delegation.
The court held that the newscaster had no privilege to enter and
that the police lieutenant was himself liable for trespass in author-
izing the newscaster's entry. Other cases resolving the issues of
concert of action in a more definitive fashion will surely arise in
the future.
V. CASES CONCERNING MISCONDUCT IN BOTH THE
NEWSGATHERING AND PUBLICITY STAGES
When a news medium and its reporters engage in both ques-
tionable newsgathering and undesired publicity in a single inci-
dent, the relationship between the two elements of conduct comes
into question. The newsgathering may involve torts such as inva-
sion of right to privacy from intrusion ("intrusion-privacy"), tres-
pass, inducing breach of confidential relation, or fraud, and the
publication may involve invasion of the right to privacy concerning
publicity given embarrassing private facts ("publicity-privacy"),
invasion of privacy stemming from placing the plaintiff in a false
light ("false-light privacy"), or pure defamation. A court may take
at least three logical approaches to deal with this potential di-
lemma of overlapping liability.
166. "Defendant merely assumed consent of plaintiff because of the prior publication
of the article and picture elsewhere. That is not enough to escape liability, but mere lack of
further investigation under all the circumstances should not impose punitive damages in
this case." Id. at 1209, 159 S.W.2d at 296.
167. 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
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First, the court may treat the two possible torts entirely sepa-
rately, as independent tort claims. The court can allow recovery for
the newsgathering if it finds that conduct tortious; it then will con-
fine the damages to the damages appropriate for that tort. The
court also may allow recovery for the publication if it finds that
the facts publicized are private and that the public has no legiti-
mate concern with them. Again, damages must be appropriate for
that tort. The fact that one aspect of the reporter's conduct consti-
tutes a tort does not provide a basis for augmented damages for
the other conduct if the other conduct is not independently
tortious.168
Second, the court may start with consideration of the news-
gathering conduct. If the court finds the newsgathering conduct
tortious, a cause of action arises, and it can treat the emotional
distress attendant to the subsequent publicity as consequential
damages, even though it may regard the publicized facts as news-
worthy and not actionable if properly obtained. 16
Finally, the court may start with consideration of the publica-
tion. Even though the facts publicized are highly embarrassing to
the plaintiff, their publication is privileged if the facts are true,
newsworthy, or of legitimate concern to the public. The privilege,
however, may be treated as lost if the reporter obtained the infor-
mation by wrongful conduct, and the plaintiff may recover for the
publication. 17 0 Both of the latter two approaches place the empha-
168. The court in Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
947, (1969), apparently took this approach:
Where there is intrusion, the intruder should generally be liable whatever the content
of what he learns. . . . On the other hand, where the claim is that private information
concerning plaintiff has been published, the question of whether that information is
genuinely private or is of public interest should not turn on the manner in which it has
been obtained. Of course, both forms of invasion may be combined in the same case.
Id. at 705-06. The court found no liability on either basis.
169. In Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), the court stated:
No interest protected by the First Amendment is adversely affected by permitting
damages for intrusion to be enhanced by the fact of later publication of the informa-
tion that the publisher improperly acquired. Assessing damages for the additional emo-
tional distress suffered by a plaintiff when the wrongfully acquired data are purveyed
to the multitude chills intrusive acts. It does not chill freedom of expression guaran-
teed by the First Amendment. A rule forbidding the use of publication as an ingredient
of damages would deny to the injured plaintiff recovery for real harm done to him
without any countervailing benefit to the legitimate interest of the public in being in-
formed. The same rule would encourage conduct by news media that grossly offends
ordinary men.
Id. at 250. The defendant could have published the information in this case, if rightfully
obtained, as a matter of legitimate public concern.
170. In Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1119, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), the court found the
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sis on the nature of the newsgathering conduct.
These three approaches are not necessarily exclusive of each
other. When a choice is required, however, I am inclined to think
that the second one is the most appropriate.
An analogous problem exists when the defendant directs tor-
tious conduct in newsgathering against a third party but the infor-
mation obtained and published concerns the plaintiff. Apparently,
no case authority exists on whether the misconduct toward the
third party is relevant to the plaintiff's suit.171
VI. REMEDIES AND SANCTIONS
Tort remedies have two major purposes: to make the injured
party whole, usually by compensating him for his injury, and to
punish the wrongdoer and deter wrongful conduct.172 The remedy
of damages may serve both purposes, but the remedy of injunction
serves only the second purpose.
17 3
A. Injunction
Injunction is available very infrequently as a remedy against
the tortious conduct of investigative reporters, especially in the
case of a tort concerning publication. Calling it "prior restraint,"
the media argue that an injunction constitutes a form of censor-
ship and, therefore, is in direct violation of the speech and press
clauses of the first amendment. The courts generally have agreed
with the media's view and virtually have precluded injunctive re-
lief in defamation and publicity-privacy cases. 74 Possibly an in-
information to be private, and held that an action of publicity-privacy would lie. The court
did not refer to the surreptitious obtaining of a picture, except to say that the act would not
warrant punitive damages. The wrongful intrusion was not the act of the defendant-the
defendant simply did not inquire about permission to publish.
171. The analogy to other torts, such as tortious interference with prospective rela-
tions, would suggest that the cause of action would still lie. See Tarleton v. M'Gawley,
Peake N.P. 270, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (1793) (firing at natives to drive them away and prevent
trading); Garret v. Taylor, Cro. Jac. 567, 79 Eng. Rep. 485 (1621) (threats of violence against
prospective customers). I think the same result would apply here.
In Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1119, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), the court encountered,
but did not resolve, another analogous situation, in which the defendant's publication was
wrongful, and a third party independently had engaged in misconduct in the newsgathering
stage. See supra note 170.
172. Section 901 of the Second Restatement of Torts acknowledges these two princi-
pal "purposes for which actions of tort are maintainable," and adds the additional purposes
of (3) determining rights, and (4) vindicating parties and deterring retaliation and violent
self-help. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF ToRTS § 901 (1976).
173. Damages are treated in id. §§ 901-932; injunction is treated in id. §§ 933-951.
174. The principal case is Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See F. FRIENDLY,
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junction might be granted in a case in which the publication previ-
ously was determined defamatory and the defendant persisted in
publishing it. The Supreme Court presently is considering the
question of whether a law, without violating the first amendment,
may prohibit a newspaper from publishing material that it has ob-
tained through the use of the discovery process in a pending
trial. 1
7 5
The argument that an injunction constitutes censorship
through prior restraint is not as strong in regard to torts arising
from newsgathering activities. Here the courts would enjoin con-
duct, not publication. Practical difficulties in utilizing an injunc-
tion, however, still exist. A trespass into a person's home to obtain
embarrassing papers is completed by the time the action becomes
known and nothing remains to enjoin; injunctive relief, then, serves
no useful purpose. The court, however, may enjoin repeated tres-
passes. For example, in the classic case of Galella v. Onassis,1 6 in
which a photographer seriously and continuously harassed Mrs.
Onassis and her children whenever they were outside their home,
the court resorted to a carefully drafted injunctive order."'
B. Damages
In tort cases generally, and particularly in cases concerning
the torts treated here, the courts usually grant relief in the form of
damages. The common law regards a monetary award as the means
of compensation-the device for making an injured plaintiff whole
through the substitution of a monetary award for the failure to
wipe out the plaintiff's pain and suffering, emotional distress, or
the harm to reputation. The legal system depends on the good
sense of the factfinder, usually the jury subject to the control of
the judge, to determine the appropriate compensation for the in-
jury in specific monetary figures; no standard charts or formulae
exist to make this determination.
The common law also regards a monetary award as a means of
sanction against the tortfeasor. Unduly high awards, however, may
MINNESOTA RAG (1981).
175. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash. 2d 726, 654 P.2d 673 (1982), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983); see also Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010
(D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979), afl'd sub nom. Halkin v.
Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
176. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). For the district court's opinion, see 353 F. Supp. 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
177. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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have a substantially chilling effect, producing self-censorship and
thereby violating the first amendment. Almost certainly the size of
the award was an important factor in inducing the Supreme Court
to act in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan. The common law
principles that the Alabama court had relied upon in that case had
been in effect when the Bill of Rights was adopted.
178
In the other landmark defamation case, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,17 9 the Court laid down an important constitutional
rule that "the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability
under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York
Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compen-
sate him for actual injury."1 0 The opinion in Gertz left considera-
ble doubt as to whether the courts can award punitive damages
when the fault standard of New York Times is met. The lower fed-
eral courts, however, now seem agreed after early vacillation that
punitive damages are available. 11 The Supreme Court has given no
sign of unhappiness with the emerging result.
Since astronomical verdicts have become commonplace, the
news media appear to have adopted the strategy of the soft drink
companies a number of years back in the bug-in-a-bottle cases: de-
fend vigorously every case whether it has merit or not and do eve-
rything imaginable, including appeals as far as possible, to delay
the trial and to make it more expensive. For this reason, if the
court grants a reasonable award in terms of compensation for the
injury incurred, the plaintiff actually loses money because of the
expenses of the trial. The courts' awareness of this may influence
their attitude toward the size of the verdict.
Dietemann v. Time, Inc.182 illustrates the inadequacies of
mere compensatory damages in cases of drawn-out litigation. In
that case two reporters gained access to plaintiff's home under a
ruse and surreptitiously took pictures and recorded the conversa-
178. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). For a full account of the case, see Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic
Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1965).
179. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
180. Id. at 350. The Gertz rule provided an opportunity to treat measure of damages
as a constitutional fact subject to full appellate review; the Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976), however, failed to seize the opportunity.
181. See, e.g., Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977); Buckley v.
Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 1062 (1976); Newspaper Publishing
Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 224 S.E.2d 132 (1976); see also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,
162 n.7 (1979) (punitive damages assumed).
182. 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968), afl'd, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
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tion. The defendant published the details in Life magazine. The
trial judge awarded $1,000, which seems like fairly reasonable com-
pensation for the injury of intrusion and serves gently to character-
ize the defendants' conduct as tortious. Since the litigation took
place over an eight-year period, one may question whether the
award adequately "compensated" the plaintiff or whether any
plaintiff's attorney would be inclined to take a case of this sort
today. On the other hand, the litigation substantially cost the news
medium, and may have served as a sanction against letting report-
ers engage in similar conduct again.
The reference here to sanctions makes this an appropriate
place to make brief reference to a very analogous situation. Under
the constitutional law of the United States, if the police make an
illegal search or engage in illegal interrogation, the government
may not make use in a criminal prosecution of evidence or infor-
mation obtained directly or indirectly from the illegal conduct.
The sanction is suppression of the evidence, a very strong and usu-
ally effective sanction.8 3 The full analogy to tortious newsgather-
ing would be to hold that the information wrongfully obtained by
the reporter cannot be published and may be enjoined. That ap-
pears not to have been suggested, but cases in the two situations
involving a question of whether the conduct was wrongful are
largely analogous. For example, if the policeman or the reporter
himself does not engage in the wrongful conduct but is given the
information by someone else who wrongfully obtained it, what
should be the result?184 Some judges and lawyers, including the
Chief Justice, would like to change the sanction in the criminal
evidence case and rely instead on the sanction of a tort action
against the policeman who conducted the illegal search.
185
183. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.2
(1978). Evidence obtained indirectly as a result of the illegal action is called the "fruit of the
poisonous tree." See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); W. LAFAVE, supra, §
11.4.
184. Compare Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947
(1969), with cases in which the Court holds that under the "private-search" rule, the govern-
ment can introduce into evidence material obtained by a private illegal search if the govern-
ment did not participate in the illegal action. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465
(1921); W. LAFAvE, supra note 183, § 1.6. But cf. United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320
(5th Cir. 1975), in which a nurse who accused a doctor of filing fraudulent medicare claims
brought the FBI some duplicated documents. The FBI accepted the documents, but told the
nurse not to bring any more; she did and they accepted them.
185. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See generally W. LAFAvE, supra note 183, § 1.6




A few other potential remedies have not proved as effective or
useful as they might. One remedy is a declaratory judgment find-
ing that a defamatory statement is untrue. The declaratory judg-
ment remedy essentially is a suit for nominal damages that may
avoid certain defenses otherwise available. 186 Another remedy is
self-help; the plaintiff, if he has a forum, may deny publicly the
truth of a defamatory statement. The Supreme Court, however,
has held that the right-of-reply statutes, giving the defamed person
an opportunity to respond in the newspaper that defamed him, are
unconstitutional on the ground that the statutes dictate to the
newspaper what it must publish.
187
VII. CONCLUSION
One of the most significant developments in recent years, in
both constitutional and tort law, began with the holding in New
York Times v. Sullivan that the first amendment places substan-
tial restrictions on the common law tort action for defamation. 88
Although the ramifications of New York Times are still developing,
that continuing reform of the law of defamation will result is to be
expected.
The readjustment of the balancing of conflicting interests that
New York Times represents came about at the behest of the press,
and the press have been the primary beneficiaries of these develop-
ments. Indeed, some commentators contend that the major first
amendment protections from an action for defamation that now
exist apply only to the media, since the first amendment speaks
expressly of the press. I find myself in disagreement. The first
amendment speaks of both "freedom of speech and of the press."
186. In this case the plaintiff is seeking only vindication of his reputation. See supra
note 172. When the plaintiff announces that he will give to charity any award that he ob-
tains, he is seeking not only seeking vindication, but also punishment of the defendant.
187. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). On remedies for
defamation in general, see W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 1078-82 (7th ed. 1982).
188. The Court has held that the first amendment also places limitations on the tort
action for invasion of the right of privacy. See supra notes 65-68 & 87-104 and accompany-
ing text. It also has applied the limitations to an action for injurious falsehood, or disparage-
ment of products. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 28
(1984).
For the present state of the law of defamation in England, see Bevan, The Recent De-
cline and Fall of Freedom of the Press in English Law, 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 31
(1983).
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The constitutional protections should protect the ordinary citizens
as well as the media, whether the suit is in slander for an oral
statement or in libel for a written one. The privilege of fair report,
for example, should apply on behalf of an individual who attends a
public meeting and orally describes it accurately and fairly to a
friend.189 This equality of protection will not harm the press,
whose members have their protection, which is not endangered.
For the press to seek to deny that protection to persons engaged in
other types of activities is to take a dog-in-the-manger position.190
While the first amendment clearly affords certain protections
to the media against tort liability arising from publication, the Su-
preme Court has not yet addressed directly the protection availa-
ble to newsgathering. The Court has stated that "newsgathering is
not without its First Amendment protections,"191 but also has
stated that "[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it
the unrestrained right to gather information." 1 2 Lower courts have
indicated that a reporter who is engaged in newsgathering is not
immune from the tort liability or criminal responsibility to which
an ordinary citizen would be subjected.193 Whether the tort liabil-
ity of the reporter is exactly the same as the liability for an ordi-
nary citizen who engages in the same conduct but without the mo-
tive of seeking to gather information to transmit to the public
remains unanswered.
To reach a determination of whether or when the first amend-
ment should provide special protection against tort liability for
newsgathering conduct, the courts addressing the problem appear
to give tacit consideration to two factors: (1) how bad was the re-
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 comment c (1976).
190. See id. § 580B comment d (1977); Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975); Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it
Add to the Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Shiffrin, Defamatory
Nonmedia Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 915 (1978). See
also supra note 61.
191. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
192. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
193. E.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1973); Dietemann v. Time,
Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971). Several Supreme Court holdings indicate that a
prohibition against interviews with prisoners, if general in nature, may constitutionally ap-
ply to reporters. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (no special opportunity for
reporters to inspect prison conditions); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); see also Lee, supra note 69, at 1249-53.
On discrimination between reporters or news media in granting access to sources of
news, see Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (gender); Los Angeles Free
Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal. App. 3d 448, 88 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1970) (newspaper's
lack of participation in particular news area).
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porter's conduct, and (2) how significant was the nature of the in-
formation that he was seeking to obtain. With respect to the first,
the defendant's conduct frequently includes trespass. The trespass
may constitute a mere technicality or may cause serious physical
harm. The common law of trespass provides that a person in an
emergency situation may have an incomplete privilege to trespass
on another's property for the purpose of saving life or limb or pro-
tecting property. For example, a person may enter another's front
yard to pick up his hat, which a sudden gust of wind had blown
away. Under this incomplete privilege, a person is not liable for the
technical trespass, but if he causes damage to the property while
trespassing, he is liable for the actual harm done.194 The Court
might consider extending the incomplete privilege under the law of
trespass to reporters. A reporter would gain an incomplete privi-
lege in regard to a mere technical trespass if his purpose was to
obtain important information for the benefit of the public as a
whole. Similar analysis could be applied in regard to the tort of
inducing breach of confidence by distinguishing between a reporter
who cynically persuades a person to disregard a confidential rela-
tion and one who merely accepts papers that someone who already
had breached the relationship brought to the reporter. In consider-
ing the nature of the reporter's conduct, it also might be appropri-
ate to ask whether the reporter resorted to the improper conduct
because no other legal means were reasonably available to insure
timely disclosure of vital information or whether the information
would soon have been disclosed anyway and the reporter simply
wanted to obtain a newsbeat over other newspapers.
The second factor affecting a determination of whether to ex-
tend first amendment protection to newsgathering conduct is the
nature of the information the reporter is seeking to obtain. Infor-
mation about a "disabled veteran with little education [who] was
engaged in the practice of healing with clay, minerals and herbs,"
but was not soliciting patients and apparently had little clientele19"
may provide interesting and newsworthy reading, but the reading
is hardly vital to the public's right to know and, therefore, may not
warrant first amendment protection against liability for trespass.
194. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 197, 263 (1963); Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict
Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARv. L. REV. 307
(1926).
195. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 926 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 449 F.2d
245 (9th Cir. 1971).
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On the other hand, a reporter who uncovers evidence that a United
States Senator is engaged in corrupt practices and is committing
other misdeeds 96 serves a very important purpose by aiding in the
effective exercise of self-government-the central reason, according
to Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, for our concept of freedom of
speech.
197
When the Supreme Court finally is ready to take a case con-
cerning newsgathering conduct and the first amendment, it may
find it useful to consider these two factors in defining the right
balance of the conflicting interests between the individual's right
to protection from tortious conduct and the public's right to know.
Instead of following this approach, the Court may want to lay
down a clear "bright line" that will eliminate the need for further
appeals, even though the solution is not a "tailor-made," individu-
alized one. This is the kind of decision that requires the give-and-
take of vigorous discussion on the part of nine justices, aided by
partisan briefs. Perhaps some discussion by commentators will
help.'98
196. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
197. See Wade, supra note 3, at 676.
198. The following significant developments have occurred since this Article was set in
page proof:
(1) Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, supra note 147, was unanimously affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court. 52 U.S.L.W. 4612 (U.S. May 21, 1984). Speaking for the
Court, Justice Powell said: "As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted by the state
legislature, the processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First
Amendment right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his
suit.. . . Thus, continued court control over the discovered information does not raise the
same spectre of government censorship that such control might suggest in other situations.
... [The] protective order prevents a party from disseminating only that information ob-
tained through use of the discovery process. Thus the party may disseminate the identical
information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through
means independent of the court's processes. . . . The prevention of the abuse that can at-
tend the coerced production of information under a state's discovery rule is sufficient justifi-
cation for the authorization of protective orders.. . ." Id. at 4616, 4617.
(2) In Boddie v. American Broadcasting Co., 731 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1984), the court
held that a cause of action was stated under the Federal Wiretap Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
20, when investigative reporters, interviewing the plaintiff in a judicial corruption scandal,
surreptitiously recorded the interview and used part of it in a television broadcast. §2520 of
the statute provided for civil liability, but exempted interception by a party to the commu-
nication unless it was done for the purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act, or "for
the purpose of committing any other injurious act." § 2511(2)(d). Plaintiff had agreed to the
interview in her home but had refused to appear on camera. It was held to be a question of
fact for the jury whether defendants' conduct was for the purpose of committing an injuri-
ous act.
(3) A Supreme Court decision on Monday, June 11, 1984, is reported to have modified
the exclusionary rule to allow evidence to be admitted if the police prove that they would
have found the evidence legally. Wall St. J., June 12, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
I
